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THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF AMNESTY IN
IMMIGRATION POLICY
[S]hall we refuse to the unhappy fugitives from distress that hospitality
which the savages of the wilderness extended to our fathers arriving in
this land? Shall oppressed humanity find no asylum on this globe? 1

I. INTRODUCTION
Eduardo Sandoval has lived in the United States without legal
status for nearly twenty years. 2 He now has a wife and three children
who are all U.S. citizens. 3 As the husband of a U.S. citizen, Eduardo
would otherwise qualify to adjust his status to that of a legal permanent
resident, 4 if not for the fact that he entered without inspection when he

1. FRANK G. FRANKLIN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES; REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO 1861 97 (1906) (quoting Thomas Jefferson’s message at the
opening of the Seventh Congress, First Session, in 1801).
2. This hypothetical is based on a real case, which I encountered working as a law clerk at an
immigration firm in Cleveland, Ohio. The name has been changed to preserve the client’s
anonymity. The basic premise is a fairly general archetype that typifies an average undocumented
immigrant who has resided in the United States for many years.
3. Eduardo married a naturally-born U.S. citizen and his children were born in the United
States. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that “[a]ll persons born . . . in the United States . .
. are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside”); see also JEFFREY S.
PASSEL, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS, NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS, BACKGROUND BRIEFING
PREPARED FOR TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION AND AMERICA’S FUTURE 19 (Pew Hispanic Center
2005), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf (providing data on the number of families that
this scenario represents: “A significant share of unauthorized families can be characterized as
‘mixed status’ in which there is one or more unauthorized parent and one or more children who are
U.S. citizens by birth.”).
4. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (West 2006) (hereinafter INA § 245;
see Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, It isn’t an Amnesty, but, 6 BENDER'S IMMIGRATION
BULLETIN 87 (2001) [hereinafter Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty] (explaining “adjustment of
status” as an alternative to consular processing).
INA § 245 is the chief vehicle by which persons within the United States adjust their
status to become legal residents. Until Congress enacted § 245 in 1952, aspiring
immigrants, even those already in the United States on a temporary visa, had to do
‘consular processing.’ Under that procedure, still available, the immigrant applies for a
visa at a U.S. consular office abroad, which is needed to seek admission to the United
States for permanent residence (the "green card").
Id.; see also IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM 636 (Matthew J. Gibney & Randall Hansen, eds. 2003)
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first came in to the country in 1988.5 The principal obstacle for Eduardo
in his quest for legal status is the requirement that he exit the United
States in order to apply for a visa. 6 Once Eduardo leaves the country he
will trigger an automatic ten-year bar to reentry. 7
Despite the fact that Eduardo has lived and worked in the United
States longer than he lived in his native country, the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) 8 provides no means for him to remain here
legally. 9 Although willing to pay fines and invoke the judicial process,

(identifying adjustment of status as the most common form of immigration: “Most immigrants are
in the United States already when their immigration visas become available. In FY2000, this was
true for 52 percent of immigrants receiving immigration visas that year.”); NELLY JEFFERYS &
NANCY RYTINA, U.S. LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2005 (2006) available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/USLegalPermEst_5.pdf; and infra note
229 and accompanying text.
5. See Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty, supra note 4. A U.S. citizen can petition for an
alien spouse to become a legal permanent resident by filing form I-130 with the U.S. Citizenship
and Naturalization Services. Id.
Many people who overstayed their visas in the last several years, or who eluded
inspection and remained, have established strong ties to the United States and are now
eligible for an immigrant visa. They are or can be the beneficiaries of a family petition
by a U.S. citizen or lawful resident, or a petition or labor certification by a U.S.
company.
Id.
6. Because Eduardo entered without inspection he has not officially entered the country
according to immigration laws. “The terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an
alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization of an
immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(13) (West 2006). “[N]o immigrant shall be admitted
into the United States unless at the time of application for the admission he (1) has a valid unexpired
immigrant visa or was born subsequent to the issuance of such visa of the accompanying parent.”
Id. § 1181(a). The issuance of visas is governed by 8 U.S.C.A. § 1201. (West 2006).
7. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (West 2006) (known commonly as “the bars”). The three and
ten-year bars make adjustment of status a legal imperative for undocumented immigrants. Section
245 adjustment of status applies to undocumented immigrants under subsection (i). Id. § 1255(i);
see Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty, supra note 4.
8. All immigration laws are compiled in a uniform set of laws known as the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) and incorporated in the United States Code under Title 8.
9. The only section of the INA which would have allowed Eduardo to adjust status was
Section 245(i), which expired April 30, 2001. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(i) (West 2006); see also Michael
D. Cronin, Adjustment of Status under LIFE, INS Memoranda, 6 BENDER’S IMMIGRATION
BULLETIN 143 (2001) (“Section 245(i) of the Act allows an alien to apply to adjust status under
section 245 notwithstanding the fact that he or she entered without inspection, overstayed, or
worked without authorization.”). Any immigrant who submitted a valid petition for adjustment of
status before April 30, 2001 is still eligible to rely on the provision. Id. (“Applications and petitions
submitted under section 245(i) of the Act may not be rejected prior to May 1, 2001, as long as they
bear the required fee and the applicant's signature.”).
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the only option for Eduardo to remain in the United States is to maintain
his illegal status on the fringes of society. 10
Somewhere between eight million and twelve million
undocumented immigrants currently live and work in the United States
under circumstances similar to those of Eduardo Sandoval. 11 Many of
them have established roots here that include U.S. citizens as close
family members. 12
The continually growing population of

10. See Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty, supra note 4 (describing adjustment of status as the
“only hope” for undocumented immigrants to legalize their status given the three and ten-year bars).
11. The number used for exactly how many undocumented immigrants currently live and
work in the United States is subject to interpretation. The very nature of this class’s subverted
existence makes calculating an actual number virtually impossible. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY,
STATISTICS-ILLEGAL
ALIEN
RESIDENT
POPULATION,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/illegal.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (“Estimating the
size of a hidden population is inherently difficult.”); Critics of immigrants tend to inflate the
numbers, while advocates are more likely to use lower numbers. DAVID M. REIMERS,
UNWELCOMED STRANGERS 28 (Columbia University Press 1998). “Estimating the number of
undocumented immigrants has proved to be controversial, with those wanting to halt the illegal flow
usually employing high figures to dramatize the numbers.” Id. In his staunchly anti-immigrant
book, State of Emergency, Pat Buchanan estimated the number of so-called “invaders” to be 12
million in 2006. PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, STATE OF EMERGENCY; THE THIRD WORLD INVASION
AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA 252 (Thomas Dunne Books 2006). An often-quoted source for a
generally unbiased number is the Pew Hispanic Center, which estimated the number at 11 million as
of March 2005. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED
MIGRANT
POPULATION
IN
THE
U.S
(Pew
Hispanic
Center,
2006),
http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=61. Numbers were calculated based on a
March, 2004 Population Survey, conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Department of
Labor. Id. At the current rate of growth of half million person a year the Pew Hispanic number
would be twelve million by March 2007. Is the Reid-Kennedy Bill a Repeat of the Failed Amnesty
of 1986?: Hearing on Senate-passed Reid-Kennedy Bill Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 7, 69 (2006), [hereinafter Reid-Kennedy Hearing] (noting Chairman Sensenbrenner’s
statement “[o]ur Nation’s broken immigration system has allowed the illegal immigrant population
to grow at an unprecedented half million persons a year” and Iowa Senator Chuck Grassley’s
asserted one of the highest estimates conceivable: “based on what resulted from 1986 when there
were roughly a million people here illegally and with all the legalization and family reunification, it
came out three or four times what we had. If you consider the same ratio, then you get into numbers
that are very big and more accurately maybe 35 to 45 million.”).
12. Emma O. Guzman, Comment, The Dynamics of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: The Splitting Up of American Families, 2 SCHOLAR 95, 95100 (2000) (discussing the broad impact of 1996 immigration reform legislation as it would affect
families composed of undocumented immigrants and U.S. citizens). Family unification is one of the
central arguments used in arguing to reenact Section 245(i). Maria J. Demeo, Executive Summary
of the Policy Recommendations to the Bush-Cheney Administration on Education, Political Access,
Employment, Immigrants’ Rights, Public Resource Equity, and Access to Justice by the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund 3, 8 (2001), available at www.maldef.org
(advocating “to protect and promote the rights of the entire Latino community in the United States”
by recommending a reenactment of Section 245(i): “[e]xtension of 245(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) will certainly be one of the key legislative items first facing the Bush-Cheney
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undocumented immigrants 13 provokes controversy in various aspects of
public policy. 14 Within the debate over immigration reform lies the
underlying question of what constitutes amnesty, and whether the term
itself has prevented meaningful reform measures from taking effect.
The post-September 11th security concerns that have driven U.S.
politics in recent years have heavily impacted the amnesty debate. 15
Now more than ever, voters and lawmakers alike are concerned about
the risk of maintaining the status quo with respect to an unaccounted for
“shadow population.” 16 While some politicians propose legalization as
a means of documenting these individuals, 17 others contend that
militarizing the border and toughening enforcement of immigration laws
will better address the issue. 18 In between these two extremes are those
who advocate for broad policy reforms through a comprehensive
approach. 19
This Article attempts to inform the reader on how politics
surrounding the term itself has distracted lawmakers, and caused an
ineffective backlash against all legalization measures. 20 The deadlock
which has prevented George W. Bush’s administration from making any
significant changes to the INA can be largely attributed to this
fundamental concern over amnesty. 21
Comprehensive immigration reform has been a key talking point
for President Bush, as well as Congress, throughout his term. 22 The
issue has inspired repeated attempts to craft a reform measure, and

Administration. The Administration should support and promote legislation that provides for full
and permanent extension of the section 245(i)”).
13. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
14. See e.g. infra note 83 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 200-206 and accompanying text (discussing Senate Bill 2611). See
generally BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS; VALUES, MORALITY AND IMMIGRATION
POLICY 50 (Cambridge 2006) (including security as one reason to enact a legalization provision:
“legalizing undocumented workers coupled with a large worker program is in the interest of our
national security and constitutes a step that would aid our country in its efforts to combat
terrorism”).
18. For a discussion on mass deportation proposals see infra notes 128-132 and
accompanying text. For a discussion on the most recent attempt to alleviate this tension through
increased border security see infra notes 114-121 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 37-79 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 159-211 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 116 and accompanying text (criticizing both President Bush and members
of Congress for clamoring for change, but then stalling from putting such changes into effect).
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endless amounts of press coverage. 23 Politicians throughout this time
have campaigned by taking a stance on the issue, and voters have
reacted accordingly. 24 Despite avid attempts by Congress and voters’
enthusiastic endorsements for reform, very little progress has been made
under the Bush administration’s term. 25
In an effort to resolve the dilemma of how to address the
undocumented immigrant problem, this Article proposes two changes to
the INA. First, Congress should reenact Section 245(i). 26 This code
section provides an opportunity for undocumented immigrants to
legalize their status. 27 Section 245(i) applies only to a narrow class of
immigrants who meet the specifications prescribed by the code, and it
requires applicants to pay a substantial fee. 28 Second, the Article
suggests reexamining the three and ten-year bars, which were put into
place to deter illegal entry, but in effect have exacerbated the problem by

23. See infra notes 80-158 and accompanying text.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See infra notes 212-235 and accompanying text.
27. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(i) (West 2006). The original text of the 1994 provision reads:
(i)(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (c) of this section, an alien
physically present in the United States who--(A) entered the United States without
inspection; or (B) is within one of the classes enumerated in subsection (c) of this
section, may apply to the Attorney General for the adjustment of his or her status to that
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The Attorney General may accept
such application only if the alien remits with such application a sum equalling five times
the fee required for the processing of applications under this section as of the date of
receipt of the application, but such sum shall not be required from a child under the age
of seventeen, or an alien who is the spouse or unmarried child of an individual who
obtained temporary or permanent resident status under section 210 or 245A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act or section 202 of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 at any date, who--(i) as of May 5, 1988, was the unmarried child or spouse
of the individual who obtained temporary or permanent resident status under section 210
or 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act or section 202 of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986; (ii) entered the United States before May 5, 1988,
resided in the United States on May 5, 1988, and is not a lawful permanent resident; and
(iii) applied for benefits under section 301(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990. The sum
specified herein shall be in addition to the fee normally required for the processing of an
application under this section. (2) Upon receipt of such an application and the sum
hereby required, the Attorney General may adjust the status of the alien to that of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if--(A) the alien is eligible to receive an
immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence; and (B)
an immigrant visa is immediately available to the alien at the time the application is
filed. (3) Sums remitted to the Attorney General pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) of
this subsection shall be disposed of by the Attorney General as provided in sections
286(m), (n), and (o) of this title.
Id.
28. Id.
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creating a serious disincentive for undocumented immigrants to exit the
country. 29
This Article reflects on the current state of immigration reform, and
specifically dissects the role that amnesty has played in preventing
lawmakers from enacting meaningful changes to the INA. Section I
provides an overview of the laws at stake in this Article. 30 The Article
provides a brief introduction to “the first amnesty” and a detailed
chronology of two measures which should be the subject of debate in
any immigration reform initiative. 31 Section I concludes with a
discussion about how amnesty factors into the current proposals for
comprehensive immigration reform. 32 Section II discusses the term
amnesty and how it has been used within the context of immigration
debates. 33 The Article then applies this knowledge to the proposal for
reenacting Section 245(i). 34 Section III specifically addresses the
Article’s proposals for reform; reenacting Section 245(i) permanently,
and eliminating the bars to reentry. 35 In conclusion, the Article provides
an overview of the current debate, and responds to arguments in
opposition to the two main proposals set forth in this Article. 36
II. AMNESTY-RELATED LEGISLATION
A. Immigration Reform and Control Act
The first attempt to legalize undocumented immigrants en masse
was the Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) of 1986. 37 The
Act permitted undocumented immigrants to become legal permanent
29. Gabriela A. Gallegos, Comment, Border Matters: Redefining the National Interest in
U.S.-Mexico Immigration and Trade Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1729, 1749 (2004) (citing Edward
Hegstrom, A Risky Border Business, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 19, 2002, at A1) (“Bars to reentry have
encouraged migrant workers and border residents who work in the United States and live in Mexico
to stay for longer periods and to send for their family rather than return to their home country.”).
30. See infra notes 37-79 and accompanying text.
31. Id.
32. See infra notes 80-158 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 159-211 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 212-238 and accompanying text.
35. Id.
36. See infra notes 239-257 and accompanying text
37. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986);
Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Lindsay Schoonmaker, Basic Immigration Law 2006: Overview of U.S.
Immigration Law, 158 PLI/NY 49, 56 (2006). For a detailed analysis of IRCA with respect to the
current immigration debates see Richard A. Johnson, Note, Twenty Years of the IRCA: The Urgent
Need for an Updated Legislative Response to the Current Undocumented Immigrant Situation in the
United States, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 239, 267-75 (2007).
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residents without leaving the country for the first time since the INA
began regulating immigration in 1952. 38 In addition to a legalization
program, the law attempted to regulate illegal immigration in various
other ways. 39 The law enhanced border security measures, established
an employment verification system for employers, and imposed
sanctions on employers who hire undocumented immigrants. 40 IRCA is
widely recognized as a failed attempt to regulate undocumented
immigration. 41
The failure of IRCA to control illegal immigration now stands as
the central hurdle in any campaign for a legalization statute. 42 Known
commonly as the “first amnesty,” 43 IRCA has a pervasive legacy. 44

38. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986);
see U.S.-Mexico Migration Discussions: An Historic Opportunity: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 98-99 (2001) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, Senator) [hereinafter
U.S.-Mexico Migration Discussions], available at 2001 WL 1021792 (describing the impetus for
change to the INA that culminated when Congress passed IRCA many years later: “The current
Immigration and Nationality Act is a generation out of date. It is out of touch with the times, and
inadequate to meet modern needs.”).
39. President Ronald Reagan, Statement upon Signing S. 1200, Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (Nov. 6, 1986), at 2 [hereinafter IRCA Signing Statement] (President Reagan
introduced the legislation by describing its three basic components: “[i]n 1981 this administration
asked the Congress to pass a comprehensive legislative package, including employer sanctions,
other measures to increase enforcement of the immigration laws, and legalization. The act provides
these three essential components.”); see also Shannon Leigh Vivian, Note, Be Our Guest: A Review
of the Legal and Regulatory History of U.S. Immigration Policy Toward Mexico and
Recommendations for Combating Employer Exploitation of Nonimmigrant and Undocumented
Worker, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 189, 206-08 (explaining the employer sanctions implemented by
IRCA and why they failed to deter illegal immigration).
40. See Paul L. Frantz, Undocumented Workers: State Issuance of Driver’s Licenses Would
Create a Constitutional Conundrum, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 519-526 (providing an overview of
the various aspects of IRCA).
41. See e.g. Ryan D. Frei, Comment, Reforming U.S. Immigration Policy in an Era of Latin
American Immigration: The Logic Inherent in Accompanying the Inevitable, 39 U. RICH. L. REV.
1355, 1373 (2005) (“Despite the ‘sweeping changes’ it introduced to immigration law, IRCA had a
relatively minor impact that did little to ameliorate the growing problem of illegal immigration.”).
42. Reid-Kennedy Hearing, supra note 11, at 2. The fifth and final hearing on illegal
immigration specifically addressed whether adopting an amnesty provision would cause the same
problems that the 1986 legislation provoked. Id. The Chairman of the Committee, F. James
Sensenbrenner, cast a particularly unfavorable light on the effects of IRCA; “Much of the current
immigration chaos is a direct result of the disastrous step Congress took two decades ago in passing
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986—without my vote, I might add.” Id. Rachel L.
Swarns, Failed Amnesty Legislation of 1986 Haunts the Current Immigration Bills in Congress,
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at A20 (explaining how IRCA’s amnesty failure has created skepticism
about any future amnesty provisions).
43. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the term “amnesty” using IRCA
as the quintessential example). See also Border Security and Immigration Issues, Hearing before
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of James R. Edwards, Jr., Hudson Institute) [hereinafter Border Security
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Following IRCA, illegal immigration continued to rise, and many
undocumented immigrants in the United States remained without legal
status when the opportunity to apply expired. 45 The critical failure of
IRCA in terms of inspiring sympathetic supporters was the relative ease
of the legalization process. 46
B. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(“IIRIRA”) of 1996 made a bold attempt to reduce the growing number
A new code section barring
of undocumented immigrants. 47
undocumented immigrants from reentry was incorporated as part of this
expansive body of law. 48 The bars were draconian measures intended to

and Immigration Issues Hearing] (citing the Black’s definition of amnesty and noting that IRCA is
used as an example in the definition as part of his testimony to Congress regarding S. 2611).
Contra SUSAN GONZALEZ BAKER, THE CAUTIOUS WELCOME: THE LEGALIZATION PROGRAMS OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND CONTROL ACT 26 (The RAND Corporation & The Urban Institute 1990)
(refuting IRCA’s label of amnesty and deeming it a "targeted program that balanced the offer of
legalization with stringent requirements").
44. See
This
Month
in
Immigration
History:
May
1987,
http://149.101.23.2/graphics/aboutus/history/may1987.html (relating the connection between IRCA
and the current debate: “In the wake of several ongoing programs to adjust the immigration status of
other previously illegal migrants, and in light of continuing shortages of labor in many sectors of the
U.S. economy, including its technology and service sectors, some, like the AFL-CIO, have called
for another general amnesty for some or all of those currently in the United States illegally.”).
45. Kierra LoBreglio, Note, The Border Security and Immigration Improvement Act: A
Modern Solution to a Historic Problem?, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 933, 949-50 (2004) (comparing
IRCA to the Border Security and Immigration Improvement Act and noting the failure of IRCA);
Michael J. Mayerle, Comment, Proposed Guest Worker Statutes: An Unsatisfactory Answer to a
Difficult, if not Impossible, Question, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 559, 571 (2002) (noting
statistical data on the ineffectiveness of IRCA: “the percentage of farm workers in the United States
who are undocumented increased from seven percent just after the 1986 immigration amnesty law
to thirty-seven percent during 1994-95”).
46. See JASON JUFFRAS, IMPACT OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT ON THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 60 (The RAND Corporation & The Urban Institute
1991) (providing results of a 2-year study on the implementation of IRCA, which revealed that the
criteria for legalization were generally not enforced: “The INS exempted many immigrants from the
English and civics requirement and devised several ways for applicants to demonstrate the minimal
competence in English and civics needed for permanent residency. As of January 1990, the Phase 2
denial rate for the general legalization program was approximately 1 in 10,000.”).
47. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009 (1996). See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President on
Signing Budget and Immigration Bill (Oct. 1, 1996) (referencing President Clinton’s ideals upon
signing the law: “[t]his bill also includes landmark immigration reform legislation that reinforces
the efforts we have made over the last three years to combat illegal immigration. It strengthens the
rule of law by cracking down on illegal immigration at the border, in the workplace, and in the
criminal justice system”).
48. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9) (West 2006) (I.N.A. § 212) (describing the three and ten-year
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sanction illegal entry. 49 They did so by imposing a three or ten-year bar
to admission or reentry upon any undocumented immigrant who had
maintained an unlawful presence within the United States. 50 Much like
current proposals to reform immigration, which suggest penalty taxes
and criminal convictions to punish the act of illegal entry and stay, the
bars were introduced as a means to deter defiance of immigration laws. 51
The practical effect of the bars has not been deterrence of illegal
entry or stay, but rather a disincentive for undocumented immigrants to
leave once they have entered without inspection. 52 Because any attempt
to exit the country or apply for status might trigger the bars, an
undocumented immigrant successfully avoids the bars by remaining in
the United States and not applying for any immigration benefit. 53 Given
the serious penalties for making their presence known, undocumented
immigrants are now more likely than ever to remain undetected. 54

bars for lawful immigration once an undocumented immigrant is found to have been present
illegally).
49. Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of Radical Change in Immigration Law: An Inside Perspective, 16
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 349, 355 (2005). While the bars were intended to punish immigrants who
had evaded the law through entry or extended stays, imposing the provision on families who had
legitimate means to legalize status would punish too harshly. Barbara Hines, So Near Yet So Far
Away: The Effect of September 11th on Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 8 TEX. HISP. J.L.
& POL’Y 37, 39 (2002) (describing the 1996 immigration laws as draconian).
50. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (West 2006) (I.N.A. §212); Stephen Yale-Loehr & Brian
Palmer, Unlawful Presence Update, 6 BENDER’S IMMIGRATION BULLETIN 507, at 1
(2001) (explaining the function of the three-year bar). While there are stiffer penalties for forced
removal, these penalties apply to immigrants who leave voluntarily before proceedings begin. Id.
Unlawful presence of 180 days to one year subjects the immigrant to the three-year bar. Id. A stiff
penalty of ten years applies to unlawful presence that exceeds one year. Id.
51. See Stephen W Yale-Loehr & Miller Mayer, Basic Immigration Law 2006: Overview of
U.S. Immigration Law, 158 PLI/NY 49, 57 (2006) (explaining the objective of IIRIRA: “In 1996
Congress adopted a get-tough attitude toward out-of-status foreign nationals. . . . The 1996 law
increased penalties for many immigration violations.”).
52. See PASSEL, supra note 3, at 3 (providing speculative data on how the undocumented
immigrant population has grown since Congress passed IRRIRA: “the unauthorized population has
been steadily increasing in size (and possibly by large increments since the last half of the 1990s)”).
53. See INS Advises Field Offices on Sunset of INA § 245(i), 2 BENDER’S IMMIGRATION
BULLETIN 847 (1997) (explaining to INS field officers how Section 245(i)’s expiration will affect
the bars: “Other persons besides immediate relatives (spouses, parents and children of U.S. citizens)
of U.S. citizens who are eligible to immigrate based on an available visa number, but who arrived
without inspection or who violated their status can apply for adjustment of status under section
245(i) by paying a penalty. If 245(i) sunsets, they will be required to apply for their immigrant visa
abroad, at which time they will be found inadmissible, if they have been unlawfully present in the
U.S. for more than 180 days before leaving the U.S.”).
54. See Tamar Jacoby, The United States Should Legalize Illegal Immigration, in
IMMIGRATION 108 (Louise I. Gerdes, ed., 2005) (explaining how current immigration policy
contravenes the rule of law: “Undocumented workers fear police and other authorities, thereby
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Essentially, the bars are counter-effective, in that they augment the vast
population of undocumented immigrants who have every incentive to
avoid alerting authorities of their presence. 55
C. Section 245(i)
While the bars ran afoul of immigration goals and exacerbated the
existing problems, Section 245(i) provided the necessary balance to
legitimize immigration policy. 56
Congress enacted Section 245(i) for the first time in 1994. 57
Originally the provision was implemented to aid applicants who already
qualified to adjust status via consular processing. 58 For those applicants
who were eligible for adjustment of status at a consulate abroad, Section
245(i) granted domestic INS offices the authority to adjudicate those
undermining law enforcement in their communities. They come to believe the U.S. laws, like the
immigration code, are meant to be winked at.”).
55. Id.
56. See Hearing on H.R. 3362 Before the H. Subcomm. on International Law, Immigration,
and Refugees of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 5 (1994) (statement of Katherine L.
Vaughns, submitted prior to hearing). In this testimony given when Congress was considering
Section 245(i) for the first time, Professor of Law Katherine L. Vaughns articulated the immigration
goal served by Section 245(i):
[S]ection 302 of Title III prohibits the privilege of adjusting one’s status here in the
United States to those beneficiaries of immediate relative visa approvals heretofore
eligible to receive such benefit. This is a congressional prerogative. However, in light
of recent congressional action allowing otherwise ineligible applicants the adjustment of
status privilege, perhaps section 302 may prove to be counter-productive. Given the
apparent legislative desire to provide an incentive for aliens to adjust their status in the
United States instead of going abroad for immigrant visa processing overseas, such a
measure would thwart this objective.
Id.; see also PASSEL, supra note 3, at 16 (identifying Section 245(i)’s disappearance as a possible
explanation for the increased undocumented immigrant population: “There is some suspicion that
the more-or-less orderly transition process . . . may have been short-circuited by the legislative
changes of the late 1990s, especially affecting 245(i). If true, this change should partially explain
the buildup in the unauthorized Mexican population.”); but see Steven A. Camarota & Jessica
Vaughan, Op.-Ed., A Loophole in Immigration Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1997, available at
http://www.cis.org/articles/1997/sac_jfv10-21-97.html (arguing against Section 245(i) in order to
give effect to the bars: “The sunset of 245(i) is necessary in order to activate a powerful
enforcement tool passed last year. . . . If 245(i) ends as scheduled, any illegal alien who aspires to
[sic] a green card will have to return home within six months or be subject to the new bar.”).
57. Pub. L. No. 103-317, § 506(b), 108 Stat 1724 (1994); Stanley Mailman & Stephen YaleLoehr, INA 245: How it Works, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 22, 2001, 3, col. 1, [hereinafter Mailman & YaleLoehr, INA]; Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., Steven C. Bell, & Thomas E. Moseley, IMMIGRATION
LEGISLATION. HANDBOOK § 9:22 (Thomson/West 2006).
58. NICOLE W. GREEN, IMMIGRATION; CQ’S VITAL ISSUES SERIES 64 (Ann Chih Lin ed., CQ
Press 2002) (“The provision represented a rare opportunity for illegal immigrants to gain legal
status, since ordinarily they would have to return to their home countries to apply for a visa and
most would not risk leaving the United States with no sure prospect of legal reentry.”).
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petitions. 59 Section 245(i) was initially adopted as an efficiency
measure that would not have a broad impact on immigration controls,
and it was enacted on a provisional basis, set to expire three years after
its inception. 60
Although not intended as an amnesty provision, 61 Section 245(i)
had the effect of allowing immigrants who entered without inspection
(“illegally”) to legalize status without leaving the country. 62 In 1997
when Congress extended Section 245(i)’s sunset date to January 14,
1998, it did so with full knowledge of the far-reaching application that
the provision had enjoyed over the first three-year period of
enforcement. 63
The 1997 reenactment demonstrated that when a provision designed
to aid undocumented immigrants is considered without political
underpinnings, which attach to any amnesty debate, it garners bipartisan
support. 64 While some may characterize the 1997 reenactment as an
oversight on the part of the legislature, the legislative history indicates
that Congress intended the reenactment as both welcomed and
necessary. 65

59. Legal Immigration Family Equity Act, § 1(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255 (West 2006);
Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty, supra note 4.
60. Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty, supra note 4 (providing background information on
Section 245(i): “Its rationale, when initially passed, was to ease the burden on applicants who would
eventually get their green card anyway via consular processing. And the State Department approved
the provision on grounds of efficiency: it saw little sense in taxing the workload of its consulates
overseas with applications that could be done by INS offices at home.”).
61. Lofgren, supra note 49 at 363 (providing an inside perspective on Congress’ immigration
reform in 1996; “During the mark-up of IIRIRA, I can recall no discussion of Section 245(i).”).
62. GREEN, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
63. Lofgren, supra note 49 (“Congress voted several times to extend section 245(i), to
temporarily avert the problem of 3/10-year bar.”).
64. Similarly, when IRCA passed the term “amnesty” had not yet developed the negative
political connotations that it invokes today. While there was debate over whether to adopt such a
measure, and some legislators strongly disagreed, those who supported legalization did so without
defending the rhetoric used. See 132 CONG. REC. S26,879-01 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement
of Sen. Moynihan) (strongly endorsing amnesty: “[f]ortunately, this bill does provide amnesty, for
those illegal aliens who entered this country prior to January 1, 1982”); see also Amnesty for Illegal
Immigrants: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Borders, and Claims of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 6 (2006) (statement of Rep. King) [hereinafter Hearing on Amnesty
for Illegal Immigrants] (referencing the lack of debate over use of the word amnesty in the IRCA
legislative history: “we passed amnesty in 1986 and no one argued whether there was amnesty or
not in 1986 because President Reagan declared it to be amnesty . . . . ”); IRCA Signing Statement,
supra note 39 (describing the legalization plan signed in to law without any hedging on the benefit
to undocumented immigrants, but not specifically mentioning the term “amnesty”: “[w]e have
consistently supported a legalization program which is both generous to the alien and fair to the
countless thousands of people throughout the world who seek legally to come to America”).
65. Joint Memorandum Concerning the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act of 2000 and
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Legislators embraced Section 245(i) as a necessary compliment to
the bars. For the majority of undocumented immigrants Section 245(i)
was the only section of the INA that allowed adjustment of status
without triggering one of the bars. 66 Because Section 245(i) created a
means to process adjustment of status applications domestically, it
eliminated the threat of the bars for certain undocumented immigrants. 67
The last extension of Section 245(i) came as part of the Legal
Immigration Family Equality (“LIFE”) Act, enacted on December 10,
Arguably, this was the first time that Section 245(i)
2000. 68
The Life Act Amendments of 2000, Proceedings and Debates of the 106th Cong., 146 CONG. REC.
S11,850-02, S11,851 (2000) (explaining the legislative intent of the amendments, which included an
extension of Section 245(i): “Because both the original LIFE ACT and this legislation were
developed outside the ordinary Committee process, they were not accompanied by the usual reports
elaborating on the background and purpose of their provisions. This memorandum is accordingly
submitted on behalf of the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Immigration of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to provide such elaboration in somewhat abbreviated
form.”). The memorandum encourages a liberal application of the extension: “to ensure that all
potentially eligible persons have an opportunity to qualify for 245(i), if necessary the INS should
accept petitions and applications before the April 30, 2001 sunset date that do not contain all
necessary supporting documents, and allow additional documents to be filed after the deadline.” Id.
66. Senator Kennedy described the function of Section 245(i) when he endorsed a bill, the
Uniting Families Act of 2002, which would have reenacted the provision:
This legislation extends section 245(i), a vital provision of U.S. immigration law which
allows individuals who already legally qualify for permanent residency to process their
applications in the United States, without returning to their home countries. Without
245(i), immigrants are forced to leave their families here in the U.S. and risk separation
from them for up to 10 years.
Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 148 CONG. REC. S4,147-01, S4,155 (2002)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy). Uniting Families Act of 2002:
SEC. 2. LIMITED EXTENSION OF SECTION 245(i) PROGRAM. (a) EXTENSION
OF FILING DEADLINE.-Section 245(i)(1)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1255(i)(1)(B)(i)) is amended by striking "on or before April 30, 2001" and
inserting "on or before April 30, 2003." (b) EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN
INADMISSIBLE AND DEPORTABLE ALIENS.-The amendment made by subsection
(a) shall not apply to any alien who is-(1) inadmissible under section 212(a)(3), or
deportable under section 237(a)(4), of the Immigration and Nationality Act (relating to
security and related grounds); or (2) deportable under section 237(a)(1)(G) of such Act
(relating to marriage fraud). (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendment made by
subsection (a) shall apply to applicants for adjustment of status who are beneficiaries of
petitions for classification or applications for labor certifications filed before, on, or after
the date of enactment of this Act.
Id.
67. Id.
68. Legal Immigration Family Equity Act, § 1(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255. President William J.
Clinton, Statement upon Signing H.R. 4577 (Dec. 21, 2000), at 2, available at 2000 WL 1871653.
This final reenactment differed sharply from the previous versions which had passed without
political controversy. The President’s signing statement acknowledged that the legislation was not
easily agreed upon: “While I am disappointed that the legislation fails to eliminate the disparate
treatment under our immigration laws sought for Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Hondurans, Haitians,
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was smeared with the label of amnesty. 69 The news release for the
Act specifically denied the label, and from that moment it
became clear that continued reenactments would no longer pass through
Congress without controversy. 70 Although the provision had received
enthusiastic support from both President Clinton 71 and President
Bush, 72 Section 245(i) expired on April 30, 2001. 73
and Liberians and does not provide any relief for deserving individuals affected by changes in the
1996 immigration law, it is the best compromise that could be reached after several rounds of
intense negotiations.” Id. President William J. Clinton, Message to Congress, Message on
Unfinished Work of Building One America (Jan. 15, 2001), at 18. The President asserted that the
four-month extension of Section 245(i) was inadequate. He pressed Congress to adopt the provision
permanently. Id. Courts have interpreted the intent of the statute: “the LIFE Act was written to
provide an exception to the general rule that aliens who entered the country without inspection are
ineligible to seek adjustment to lawful permanent status.” Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d
1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2005).
69. See News Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Washington, D.C. 20536, INS Implements § 245(i) Provision of the LIFE Act (Mar. 23, 2001),
available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/Section245iLIFEAct_032301.pdf (having to
defend the law from attracting this label: “it is not amnesty for all persons unlawfully in the United
States”).
70. Id.; Espinal v. Pere, 144 F. Supp. 2d 53, 54 (1st Cir. 2001) (interpreting the “not amnesty
for all persons” language of the News Release to mean that it does not apply to all persons
unlawfully in the United States, but finding the code section to be an amnesty nonetheless).
71. Fact Sheet on the Passing of a Fiscally Responsible Budget, The White House, Office of
the Press Secretary, President Clinton Calls on Congress to Act on America’s Education Priorities
(Oct. 19, 2000), at 4 (President Clinton ‘s forceful approach gave Congress a clear directive to save
Section 245(i) before the impending expiration: “People who have been living in the United States
for many years and have developed strong ties to their communities deserve the opportunity to
normalize their immigration status, and families should be allowed to stay together while an
adjustment of status application is pending. Congress should address these injustices in the
immigration system by . . . reinstating Sec. 245(i). The President will insist that Congress enact
these commonsense measures, supported by both business and fundamental fairness, this year.”).
See also Fact Sheet on Progress on America’s Priorities, President Clinton and Vice President Gore:
Progress on America’s Priorities (Dec. 15, 2000) (touting the reinstatement of Section 245(i) as one
of the administration’s most noteworthy achievements). The release acknowledged the drastic
effects of IRRIRA and urged the next Congress to do more to soften the impact. Id.
72. Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker and Democratic leader of the House of
Representatives and the Majority and Democratic leaders of the Senate, The White House, Office of
the Press Secretary (May 1, 2001), [hereinafter President Bush’s Letter to Congress]. President
Bush’s address demonstrated a solid understanding of the three and ten year bars, and
acknowledged Section 245(i) as a necessary cushion to those harsh sanctions. Id. His approach
with Congress focused on an appeal to strengthen families. Id. President Bush’s speech to the
Hispanic Chamber of Commerce in Washington, DC, Office of the Press Secretary (March 6, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020306-4.html.
I’ve told the Congress that I want to make sure that the Mexican citizen here is well
respected, and we will. We’ll respect people in our country. And one way to do that is
to pass 245(i), which will allow for families to be reunited. If you believe in family
values, if you understand the worth of family and the importance of family, let’s get
245(i) out of the United States Congress and give me a chance to sign it.
Id.
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In May of 2001, President Bush urged Congress to extend the filing
deadline for Section 245(i) beneficiaries. 74 He acknowledged that the
April deadline would be hard-felt by the multitude of undocumented
immigrants who had been eligible to apply for adjustment prior to the
deadline, but had not acted soon enough. 75
Once the deadline passed in 2001 the true effect of the bars was felt
for the first time. 76 Without Section 245(i) as part of the INA, the
possibility of adjusting status domestically disappeared completely for
any undocumented immigrant who had failed to submit a visa
application before the deadline. 77 In a sense, these individuals were
trapped by the system, unable to apply domestically, nor able to leave
and return. 78 Suddenly any attempt to legalize status became a catch-22,
whereby undocumented immigrants could not submit a visa application
without leaving the country and thereby triggering a bar to reentry. 79
III. COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM
Combining a legalization program as one element of a broader
reform effort is the basic concept behind “comprehensive immigration
reform.” 80 Comprehensive reform has become a catch-phrase which

73. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(i)(1)(B) (West 2005) (requiring that a “petition for classification under
section 1154” be filed “on or before April 30, 2001” or “an application for labor certification under
section 1182(a)(5)(A) be filed “on or before such date”).
74. President Bush’s Letter to Congress, supra note 72 (“I encourage the Congress to consider
whether there was adequate time for persons eligible under section 245(i) to apply for adjustment of
status before the filing deadline expired yesterday. . . . I would support legislation that temporarily
extends the recently expired April 30, 2001 filing deadline”).
75. Id. (“Information indicates an estimated 200,000 were eligible to file but did not meet the
deadline. Preliminary reports suggest that many applicants were unable to complete their
paperwork in time, due in part to the fact that the rules explaining how the provision would be
applied were not issued until late March.”).
76. See Charles C. Foster, 1996 Immigration Act: Its Impact on U.S. Legal Residents and
Undocumented Aliens, 34-FEB HOUS. LAW. 28, 31 (1997) (predicting the effect of the bars). The
author provides a useful interpretation of the new law from a senior immigration practitioner’s
perspective:
[T]hose who do stay here illegally will have virtually no hope of ever qualifying for legal
status. Such three-year and 10- year bar provision [sic] will virtually eliminate their
ability, as a practical matter, to ever qualify for legal status by making what is an almost
impossible task for many today completely impossible.
Id.
77. Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty, supra note 4, at 3.
78. Lofgren, supra note 49, at 361.
79. Id.
80. Tisha T. Tallman, Liberty, Justice, and Equality: An Examination of Past, Present, and
Proposed Immigration Policy Reform Legislation, 30 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 869, 891 (2005)
(concluding that an effective legalization plan must simultaneously consider immigration
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subverts the highly politicized issue of amnesty and sets the debate in a
somewhat even-handed tone. 81 Despite these avid attempts to keep the
focus off of amnesty, the issue has continually resurfaced as the central
obstacle preventing reform efforts. 82
The ebb and flow of immigration laws presents a contentious
illustration of political climates. 83 Immigration policy debates surface in
times of political and economic hardship. 84 American citizens and

enforcement). A strategy that combines legalization with law enforcement and border security
measures is the central premise of comprehensive immigration reform. Id. See also Press Release,
Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Immigration Reform (May 15, 2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060515-10.html (couching the
legalization element, while emphasizing enhanced security measures: “There is a rational middle
ground between granting an automatic path to citizenship for every illegal immigrant and a program
of mass deportation.”).
81. See id. (noting that the press release makes an obvious attempt to detract from the
legalization element, and clearly denounces amnesty, while acknowledging that enhanced security
measures alone are inadequate to address the undocumented immigrants currently present within the
U.S: “We Must Deal With The Millions Of Illegal Immigrants Who Are Already Here”).
82. Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., Employment-Based Immigration: Legislative and Administrative
Update, 1566 PLI/Corp 9, 11 (2006) (explaining the current developments in immigration law: “The
central issue of the immigration reform debate this past year is whether reform should include
stricter enforcement of our laws with greater penalties for violations, or whether reform should
include a way to legalize the currently undocumented workforce and provide a future flow of
additional low-skilled workers.” ). See also, e.g., Rachel L. Swarns, Failed Amnesty Legislation of
1986 Haunts the Current Immigration Bills in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at A20
(chronicling lawmakers’ focus on enacting amnesty legislation); see also, e.g., Paul Nussbaum,
Across U.S. Ballots Loaded with Issues; The Questions, From Stem Cells to Mourning Doves, May
Also Pull in Votes for Candidates, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 28, 2006, at A01 (quoting Jeffrey
Makin, Are Ballot Propositions Spilling Over into Candidate Elections?, 2 INITIATIVE &
REFERENDUM INST. REPORT 5 (2006), http://www.iandrinstitute.org/REPORT%2020062%20Spillovers.pdf) ("Gay marriage, stem-cell research, abortion, minimum wage, immigration and
affirmative action may be candidate-defining issues."). See also Nicholas R. Montorio, Note, The
Issue of Mexican Immigration: Where Do We Go From Here?, 6 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 169, 198-200
(2007) (highlighting the amnesty debate as a central aspect of the current dilemma).
83. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented
Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 1014-15. See also Hines, supra note 49,
at 39 (stating: “[i]mmigration law is as much an analysis of political, social, and economic trends as
the study of a specialized body of law”); see also Senator Edward Kennedy, Introduction to U.S.
Immigration Law and Policy: 1952-1979; A Report Prepared at the Request of Senator Edward
Kennedy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, upon the Formation of the
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 3 IMMIGR. & NAT'LITY L. REV. 95, 98
(1979-1980) (prefacing a report on immigration policy by acknowledging the political ramifications
of the issue: “One of the oldest themes in our history has now become one of our most contentious
issues.”).
84. JOHN ISBISTER, THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE 200 (Kumarian Press 1996) (examining the
different elements that factor in to immigration debates: “It is no coincidence that the expansive
Immigration Act of 1990 was passed at the end of a decade of steady economic growth, increasing
prosperity for many Americans (although not all) and falling employment.”). Bosniak, supra note
83, at 993 (observing how the current political situation has provoked an acute interest in
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political representatives alike have long been divided by this
fundamental legal issue of how to treat undocumented immigrants. 85 It
strikes at the core of political sentiments because it reflects one’s world
view, economic status, and racial identity. 86 Given the political
significance of the debate, reaching a pragmatic compromise has at
times seemed impossible. 87 Instead of compromise, the issue has
pushed voters and their representatives in Congress to radical ends. 88
The critical difference in how voters on both sides of the issue have
interpreted the concept of amnesty provides valuable insight into the
obstacles that have prevented Congress from drafting meaningful
immigration reform. 89
While Americans may be starkly divided on whether to allow
undocumented immigrants to adjust status, the need and desire for
effective control of our borders is a widely accepted consensus in the

immigration law: “The tragedy of September 11th and its aftermath further reinforce the political
nature of this area of law.”); see also Doris Meissner, Immigration in the Post 9-11 Era, 40
BRANDEIS L.J. 851, 851 (2002) (discussing immigration from a post 9-11 perspective, in which
security issues dominate). Meissner served as the Commissioner of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service from 1993-2000. Id. at 859. See also Aristide R. Zolberg, Reforming the
Back Door: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 in Historical Perspective, in
IMMIGRATION RECONSIDERED: HISTORY, SOCIOLOGY, AND POLITICS 336 (Virginia YansMcLaughlin ed., 1990) (categorizing illegal immigration as the back door and noting how economic
conditions inspire political debate: “Movements to close the ‘back door’ do tend to broaden their
base of support in periods of depression and unemployment, when economic insecurity is more
widespread.”).
85. U.S.-Mexico Migration Discussions, supra note 38; see infra note 92 and accompanying
text.
86. See Elizabeth M. Dunne, Comment, The Embarrassing Secret of Immigration Policy:
Understanding Why Congress Should Enact an Enforcement Statute for Undocumented Workers, 49
EMORY L.J. 623, 639 (2000) (identifying the economic factors that control the political willingness
to legislate sensitive immigration issues, particularly enforcement measures for undocumented
workers).
87. See JOHN POWELL, IMMIGRATION 48 (Facts on File 2007) (“Given the strong partisan
divisions in the American electorate, it is still not clear whether Democrats and Republicans in the
U.S. Congress can find enough common ground to pass comprehensive reform.”).
88. See, e.g., infra note 103 and accompanying text (demonstrating the radical difference
between the immigration reform legislation passed in the House of Representatives and the Senate).
89. U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, A Report to Congress (U. S. Gov.
Printing,
Washington,
DC,
1994),
Executive
Summary,
available
at
http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/exesum94.html [hereinafter U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring
Credibility] (reporting the findings of a nine-member bipartisan body, chaired by former
Congresswoman Barbara C. Jordan) (“more needs to be done to guarantee that the stated goals of
our immigration policy are met. The immediate need is more effective prevention and deterrence of
unlawful immigration.”). See Immigration’s Lost Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A24 (“One
of the many signs of the hysteria accompanying this election season is the way their moderate
approach to immigration [Republican support of the failed Senate Bill S. 2611] has been tarred as
wholesale “amnesty” for lawbreakers.”).
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aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks. 90 The post-9/11 fear of
terrorism incited a mass of legislation introduced by members of both
parties to secure our Nation. 91 The present immigration debate is
therefore not a question of whether to address the issue. 92 Rather it is a
question of how to address the issue. 93 Given the importance of
improving security, it remains imperative to any practical solution that
we first address the issue of what to do with the unaccounted-for
population of immigrants already within the United States. 94
Fundamental issues such as streamlining a complicated and
fragmented bureaucracy, developing efficient and effective services, and
determining how to prevent terrorists from passing through our borders
undetected will not fairly be addressed until Congress establishes some
90. HING, supra note 17, at 50 (providing a thorough analysis of how legalization would
effectively address our national security concerns: “By offering a program that would encourage
undocumented workers to come forward, we would be able to conduct background checks on a
large group that currently lives underground, while freeing up investigative resources to concentrate
on real threats of terror at the border and within our borders.”); see Jeffrey L. Ehrenpreis, Note,
Controlling Our Borders Through Enhanced Employer Sanctions, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 120304 (2006) (citing Nightline: Illegal Immigrant Workers (ABC television broadcast Dec. 14, 2004)
(transcript on file with the Southern California Law Review) (quoting Senator John McCain on the
security concerns posed by undocumented immigrants: “[W]e can't tell the American people that
we're winning the war on terror if hundreds of thousands or millions of people are coming across
our border every year, illegally and undocumented.”). See also Bradly J. Condon & J. Brad
McBride, Do You Know the Way to San José? Resolving the Problem of Illegal Mexican Migration
to the United States, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 251, 254 (2003) (“The debate over how to address the
issue of migrant Mexican workers in the United States is not new. The literature in this field tends
to divide along pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant lines. However, all agree that reforms are
needed.”) see also Regina Germain, PANEL DISCUSSION: Perspectives on the Bush
Administration's New Immigrant Guestworker Proposal: The Time For Immigration Reform Is
Now, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 747, 751 (2004) (“A comprehensive immigration reform bill will
be enacted in the near future. The question is not if there will be a new law, but when it will pass.”).
91. See, e.g., H.R. 10, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 5024, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 5040, 108th
Cong. (2004); H.R. 5161, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2774, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2845, 108th Cong.
(2004) (each addressing the recommendations put forth by the 9/11 Commission Report).
92. U.S.-Mexico Migration Discussions, supra note 38 (asserting the need for Congressional
action: “The status quo is not acceptable. It must be replaced with sound immigration reforms that
provide a manageable and orderly system where legality is the prevailing rule.”). See also
Cristopher J. Walker, Border Vigilantism and Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 10 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 135, 173 (2007) (asserting: “‘Comprehensive immigration reform’ is on the mind
of federal, state, and local lawmakers, and changes to the current system will be made.”)
93. Id. (“These are complicated issues, and they deserve careful consideration and debate.”)
94. See Hines, supra note 49, at 28 (recognizing the need for a legalization program to
address security concerns). See also Meissner, supra note 84, at 852 (identifying a shift in
immigration policy post-9/11: “Seeing immigration as fundamentally an economy-driven
phenomenon and looking to economics as the conceptual model through which we should be
making changes for the future is, at least for the moment, on the sidelines.”). The “security lens”
through which Meissner examined immigration in 2002 has continued to dominate these debates.
See Hines, supra note 49, at 28
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level of understanding on how to approach the twelve million
undocumented immigrants 95 currently living and working in the United
States. 96
Congress’ recent attempts to draft comprehensive immigration
reform measures 97 have provided a welcome look at a flawed system. 98
In anticipation of the 2006 mid-term elections, politicians seized the
opportunity to distinguish themselves by taking a stance on immigration
reform. 99 The media inflamed the debates and protesters marched in
large numbers to oppose the proposals 100 considered by Congress. 101

95. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
96. See generally Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary Step
Toward Immigration Law Reform, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 203, 205-332 (2002) (proposing procedural
reforms to immigration laws); see also infra note 185 and accompanying text (recommending
comprehensive immigration reform to fix the myriad of problems with the current system).
97. LoBreglio, supra note 45 at 952-54 (commenting on a 2004 directive to revise
immigration laws and concluding that meaningful reform requires a comprehensive approach). The
author examined the history of immigration reform bills and noted similarities with the 2004
legislation. Id.
98. See Immigration Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border
Security and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Richard
M. Stana).
99. E.g., Carl Hulse, In Bellweather District G.O.P. Runs on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
6, 2006, at A1; see also Mercedes Olivera, Latino Voters May Color State Blue – In Time, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 28, 2006, at 2B (observing the potential impact of Latino voters on the 2006
mid-term elections and identifying immigration as a key issue: “Republican hard-liners have led the
immigration debate around the country.”).
100. For pro-immigrant groups, much of the House Bill seemed outrageous. National
Immigration Law Center (NILC), How H.R. 4437 Would Criminalize Immigrants,
http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/CIR/hr4437immcriminalized_2006-2-28.pdf
(last
visited
January 21, 2007). Two of the most objectionable measures were the ones which would have made
it a crime to provide humanitarian aid to an undocumented immigrant and the provision which
would have made undocumented immigrants automatic felons. Id.; Allen Thomas O'Rourke, Note,
Good Samaritans, Beware: The Sensenbrenner-King Bill and Assistance to Undocumented
Migrants, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 195, 197-201 (2006). The NILC website pronounces the
mission of the organization is to “protect and promote the rights and opportunities of low-income
immigrants and their family members.” NILC Home, http://www.nilc.org/index.htm (last visited
January 21, 2007).
101. HING, supra note 17, at 8-9 (chronicling the media coverage that propelled the “furor over
illegal immigration”); Allan Chernoff, Rallies across U.S. call for illegal immigrant rights;
Hundreds of thousands join 'national day of action' in towns, cities, Apr. 10, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/10/immigration/index.html; see, e.g., Senate Passes Two
Immigration Measures, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2006, at A25, and A G.O.P. Split on Immigration
Vexes a Senator, N. Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006 (providing examples of the extensive media coverage
of the issue and commenting on the protestors who marched outside the capitol); see, e.g., Carl
Hulse & Jim Rutenberg, The Immigration Debate: Congress; Divisions Remain As Bush Presses on
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2006, at A1 (discussing the ensuing debates over amnesty and
identifying resistance from conservatives on Bush’s proposals).
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Unfortunately, the 109th Congress abandoned the project. 102 Legislation
put forth by the House of Representatives has differed sharply from
measures proposed by the Senate. 103
In December 2005, the Sensenbrenner Bill, passed by the House of
Representatives, provided the catalyst for the most recent wave of
immigration reform. 104 The Sensenbrenner Bill took an enforcementonly approach, which did not include any legalization or guest worker
provisions. 105 For immigrants and their advocates, this legislation was
purely xenophobic. 106 In response, masses across the country marched
102. See Hearing on Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, supra note 64, at 5-7 (statement of Rep.
Berman). Even before Congress failed to pass a comprehensive immigration reform bill
Representative Berman predicted that the hearings were designed to delay such action: “I am
convinced by virtue of what has happened here, both in treating the House-passed bill, what it went
through, and in the way people are titling and talking about the hearings in the Senate on the Senate
bill, that this is simply a well-orchestrated effort to have this Congress recess before the election
without having dealt with one of the country’s most serious national crises.” Id. at 7. Even
President Bush, who has been an avid advocate of comprehensive immigration reform, has been
accused of stalling action for political gain. Judicial Nominations: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Senate Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2006) (statement of Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, Comm.
On Senate Judiciary). Senator Leahy said of the President, “Instead of urging his party to take early
and decisive action to pass comprehensive immigration reform, as he signaled he would in February
2001, the President began his second term campaigning to undercut the protections of our Social
Security system.” Id; cf. Frei, supra note 41, at 1358 (coming to President Bush’s defense by
acknowledging his consistent push for immigration reform: “In the months following the election,
President Bush has made clear that his guest-worker proposal was not simply election-time rhetoric
by continuing to lobby Congress to approve a system that would dramatically change the face of
United States immigration law and policy toward Latin Americans.”).
103. Compare S. 2611, 107th Cong. (2006) with H.R. 4437, 107th Cong. (2006). The House
bill focused exclusively on law enforcement and enhanced border security without any legalization
plan. H.R. 4437, 107th Cong. (2006). The Senate bill, while also including increased border
security and law enforcement, also proposed a path to citizenship as part of a temporary guest
worker program. S. 2611, 107th Cong. (2006). This effort to pass a legalization provision stood out
as the critical difference between the two bills. Fragomen, supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See generally ISBISTER, supra note 84, at 200 (observing that “in times of economic hardship,
politicians can advance their careers by striking out against immigrants.”).
104. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R.
4437, 109th Cong. (2005). For a summary of the proposed law see American Immigration Lawyers
Association, The Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005
(H.R. 4437), as Amended and Passed by the House on 12/16/05, Section-by-Section Analysis,
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=18258 (last visited January 21, 2007).
105. H.R. 4437, 107th Cong. (2006); O’Rourke, supra note 100, at 197-201 (providing
background information and explanation of the basic provisions in H.R. 4437).
106. See Edwin R. Rubin, Toward an Immigration Policy for the 21st Century: A Plea for a
Thoughtful, Fact-Based Debate, 167 N.J.L.J. 51, 52 (2005) (identifying the xenophobic nature of
contemporary immigration discussions). The policies narrowly tailored towards those entering from
the Southern Border seemed to target Latinos. Id. For those most deeply troubled by the bill it
resembled the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. See generally Frei, supra note 41 (identifying the
Chinese Exclusion Act as the first immigration law to exclude a specific race of people because of
their failure to assimilate).
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in large numbers, drawing attention to some of the particularly radical
aspects of the bill. 107
In March 2006, a compromise bill passed in the Senate, advancing
a more liberalized approach to immigration reform. 108 This measure
incorporated President Bush’s recommendations by adopting a guest
worker program and a means for undocumented immigrants to legalize

107. O’Rourke, supra note 100, at 201 (describing one of the most radical parts of the Act:
“[w]hile many sections of House Bill 4437 have created controversy, the most troubling portion
directly affects not undocumented migrants but the millions of ordinary citizens and residents who
treat them like neighbors. Section 202 prohibits assisting an undocumented migrant to reside in the
United States and carries severe criminal penalties.”). H.R. 4437 § 202, 107th Cong. (2006).
SEC. 202. ALIEN SMUGGLING AND RELATED OFFENSES. Section 274 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324) is amended to read as follows: 'ALIEN
SMUGGLING AND RELATED OFFENSES' SEC. 274. (a) Criminal Offenses and
Penalties-(1) PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES- Whoever--(A) assists, encourages, directs, or
induces a person to come to or enter the United States, or to attempt to come to or enter
the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such person is an alien
who lacks lawful authority to come to or enter the United States; (B) assists, encourages,
directs, or induces a person to come to or enter the United States at a place other than a
designated port of entry or place other than as designated by the Secretary of Homeland
Security, regardless of whether such person has official permission or lawful authority to
be in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such person is
an alien; (C) assists, encourages, directs, or induces a person to reside in or remain in the
United States, or to attempt to reside in or remain in the United States, knowing or in
reckless disregard of the fact that such person is an alien who lacks lawful authority to
reside in or remain in the United States; (D) transports or moves a person in the United
States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such person is an alien who lacks
lawful authority to enter or be in the United States, where the transportation or
movement will aid or further in any manner the person's illegal entry into or illegal
presence in the United States; (E) harbors, conceals, or shields from detection a person in
the United States knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such person is an alien
who lacks lawful authority to be in the United States; (F) transports, moves, harbors,
conceals, or shields from detection a person outside of the United States knowing or in
reckless disregard of the fact that such person is an alien in unlawful transit from one
country to another or on the high seas, under circumstances in which the person is in fact
seeking to enter the United States without official permission or lawful authority; or (G)
conspires or attempts to commit any of the preceding acts, shall be punished as provided
in paragraph (2), regardless of any official action which may later be taken with respect
to such alien. (2) CRIMINAL PENALTIES- A person who violates the provisions of
paragraph (1) shall-- (A) except as provided in subparagraphs (D) through (H), in the
case where the offense was not committed for commercial advantage, profit, or private
financial gain, be imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or fined under title 18, United
States Code, or both.
Id.
108. S. 2611, 107th Cong. (2006); POWELL, supra note 87, at 48 (identifying the Senate bill as
a compromise measure: “By the time the Senate opened debate on March 31, it appeared that a
compromise measure was within reach, potentially legalizing millions of illegal immigrants who
had been in the United States for more than two years and including a guest-worker program.”).
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status. 109 Senate Bill S.2611 demonstrated Congressional support for
the concept of legalizing the existing population of undocumented
workers already in the country. 110 The immigration debates that
emerged in response to the proposal centered around the political divide
over legalization. 111
After months of front-page headlines, the Comprehensive
Immigration Reform Bill envisioned by President George W. Bush
Congressional
quietly disappeared from major news streams. 112
determination to reform immigration was a campaign selling point, 113
which proved to be a false promise when Congress adopted the Secure
This legislation fails the millions of
Fence Act of 2006. 114
undocumented immigrants who anticipated significant changes to
immigration laws. 115 The Secure Fence Act narrowly addresses the
109. S. 2611, 107th Cong. (2006); Fragomen, supra note 82, at 16 (explaining the three-tiered
system of legalization which passed as part of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006,
S.2611). The bill has been heavily criticized for its complexity. Id. The first tier comprises guest
workers, working on a temporary basis, but with the possibility of permanent legal status after five
years. Id. The second tier would apply to immigrants who have been in the country for two to five
years. Id. The third tier would permit undocumented workers who have lived in the United States
for five years or more. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Rachel L. Swarns, A G.O.P. Split on Immigration Vexes a Senator, N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 2006, at 11 (noting legalization as the central issue: “The legislative battle has pitted Republican
against Republican, with conservatives deriding guest worker programs as an amnesty for
lawbreakers and calling for a wall to be built along the border with Mexico, and with business
leaders pushing for legalization of the illegal workforce. . . .”).
112. See e.g., Immigration’s Lost Year, supra note 89 and accompanying text.
113. Makin, supra note 82 and accompanying text.
114. See Hearing on Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, supra note 64, at 7-8. Rep. Berman
objected to the hearings on the grounds that no legitimate purpose was served by them:
These hearings are a con-job on the American people. The Republican majority in the
House is trying to convince the American public that they want very badly to enact
immigration reform and they just need to study it a little bit more in these hearings
before they can get the job done.
Id. at 8 (statement of Rep. Berman, Member, Judiciary Committee). Rep. Logren echoed these
concerns: “I believe we are talking a lot once again. We are going to talk all over the country once
again, but I think it is all talk and no action. Talk is cheap, but I think that the American public is
going to see through this sham . . . .” Id. at 11 (statement by Rep. Lofgren, Member, H. Judiciary
Comm., Subcomm. on Immigration, Borders and Claims). Rep. Sanchez explained how the process
itself would have to take a different direction to produce results: “[i]n the history of Congress, the
House has never held hearings on a Senate-passed bill before going to conference. If this body is
truly serious about enacting much-needed border enforcement plus immigration reform legislation,
they should convene a conference that is fair and bipartisan.” Id. at 13 (statement by Rep. Sanchez,
Member, H. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Immigration, Borders and Claims).
115. While the 109th Congress did pass immigration legislation, it can hardly be said to have
addressed the concerns that had been debated in the hearings. See infra notes 117 and 126
(illustrating the difference between the Secure Fences Act and comprehensive immigration reform).
See also Makin, supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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issue of border security while ignoring the interrelated immigration
issues that effective border security demands. 116 Entirely contrary to the
comprehensive reform urged by President Bush and echoed by
Congress, 117 the resulting legislation focuses on measures that have
proven ineffective over the last two decades. 118
Without additional measures, this attempt to secure the physical
border is unlikely to achieve the desired result of controlling illegal
immigration. 119 The forces that compel illegal entry and stay have
historically continued to exert considerable influence over immigration
patterns regardless of border enforcement. 120 If the massive border

116. See Immigration Reform in Pieces, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at A22 (noting the
contradiction between President Bush’s resolve to reform immigration comprehensively and the
“pre-election lineup of narrow enforcement measures packaged to give voters a false impression of
resolve”); see also It Isn’t Amnesty, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2006, at A22 (criticizing the idea of
abandoning comprehensive immigration reform for an enforcement-only approach: “[t]he
alternatives to the Specter bill are senseless. The enforcement-only approach – building a 700-mile
wall and engaging in a campaign of mass deportation and harassment to rip 12 million people from
the national fabric – would be an impossible waste of time and resources. It would destroy families
and weaken the economy.”).
117. Compare Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Improving Worksite
Enforcement, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.C.C.A.N., (emphasizing the
importance of comprehensive reform that addresses the entire range of issues, rather than individual
aspects exclusively), with Fact Sheet: The Secure Fence Act of 2006, The White House, Office of
Comm’cns, [hereinafter Secure Fence Act Fact Sheet] (accepting a single piece of legislation as a
starting point: “Earlier this year, the President laid out a strategy for comprehensive immigration
reform. The Secure Fence Act is one part of this reform, and the President will work with Congress
to finish the job and pass the remaining elements of this strategy.”).
118. The Budgetary Impact of Current and Proposed Burden Security and Immigration
Policies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Budget, 109th Cong. 8 (2006) (statement of Paul R.
Cullinan, Chief, Human Resources Cost Estimates Unit). The report concludes that funding alone
cannot solve the flow of illegal immigration:
In recent years, funding for border security has risen sharply, but it has not kept sizable
numbers of illegal migrants from entering the country or many legal migrants from
overstaying their visas. Although the United States has nearly doubled the number of its
border patrol agents over the past decade, a large flow of immigrants continues to enter
the United States illegally.
Id. See also infra note 204 and accompanying text (criticizing an enforcement-only approach by
positing it as the antithesis of comprehensive reform).
119. Dunne, supra note 86 at 640 (identifying four possible explanations for why there is a
recognized gap between proposals and practical effects of immigration policies).
120. President Ronald Reagan in 1986 and President Bill Clinton in 1996 dramatically
enhanced border security efforts to no avail. JoAnne D. Spotts, U.S. Immigration Policy on the
Southwest Border From Reagan Through Clinton, 1981-2001, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 601, 614-17
(2002). In 1986, President Reagan signed IRCA, which authorized fifty percent increases in
personnel for the consecutive years of 1987 and 1988. Id. In 1996, President Clinton signed the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), which authorized
hiring an additional 1,000 Border Patrol agents every year until 2001. Id. In addition, Attorney
General Janet Reno’s five-part border enforcement plan, announced in 1994, provided for a massive
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security overhauls of the 1980’s and 1990’s had any effect at all it was to
propel illegal immigration further. 121
One explanation for this phenomenon is that the increased border
security deterred immigrants from exiting the country. 122 Many of the
immigrants who enter the United States for work perpetually return
home, continuing a pattern of entering and exiting in a cyclical
fashion. 123 Undocumented immigrants who are currently present are
less likely to leave even temporarily if they know that exiting will
jeopardize their opportunity to return. 124
overhaul of the border security tactics. Id. Despite these concerted efforts to curtail unreported
border traffic, the population of undocumented immigrants doubled during President Clinton’s term.
Id.
121. LoBreglio, supra note 45, at 949-53 (analyzing the Border Security and Immigration
Improvement Act, a proposed immigration reform bill, by comparison to earlier attempts to revise
the law). The author commented on the failure of IRCA: “In 1992 . . . the Commission on
Agricultural Workers reported that, despite the IRCA amendments to the INA, illegal immigration
had continued to rise, working conditions for farm workers had continued to decline, and the rate of
unemployment for domestic agricultural workers remained high.” Id. at 949-50. The author also
summarized the ineffectiveness of IIRIRA: “Despite an increase in arrests along the border, the
IIRIRA, like so many other reforms before it, failed to produce a dramatic downturn in illegal
immigration. Immigration and naturalization statistics approximate that during Clinton’s presidency
the number of illegal aliens coming to the United States had increased at a rate of 300,000 per year
and that by July of 2000, there were six million illegal immigrants residing here.” Id. at 952.
122. Camille J. Bosworth, Note, Guest Worker Policy: A Critical Analysis of President Bush’s
Proposed Reform, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1106 (2005). Bosworth summarizes how increased
border security can cause the number of undocumented immigrants to grow:
Whereas in the beginning migrants came seasonally and then returned home with their
earnings, workers now stay longer and often settle permanently in the United States.
This is largely a result of the increasing risk associated with crossing the border. As the
costs of crossing the border illegally rise, temporary workers remain in the United States
longer rather than risk being apprehended at the border when they decide to return.
Id.
123. See Richard C. Jones, Macro-Patterns of Undocumented Migration between Mexico and
the U.S., in PATTERNS OF UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION; MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 34
(Richard C. Jones ed., Rowman & Allanheld 1984) (describing the characteristics of a typical
undocumented migrant: “He spends six months to a year in the U.S. before returning to Mexico, and
makes four or five such trips in a lifetime.”); see also Nicole Jacoby, Note, America’s De Facto
Guest Workers: Lessons From Germany’s Gastarbeiter for U.S. Immigration Reform, 27 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1569, 1608 (2004) (commenting on the cyclical pattern of Mexican migration: “Mexican
workers rarely migrate to the United States with the intent of becoming permanent settlers.”).
Mexican migrants comprise the majority of undocumented immigrants in the United States.
Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and Without
Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 10 (2006) (defining undocumented immigrants as a
class of people: “Undocumented immigrants that enter the United States without authorization are
primarily Mexicans and Central Americans that cross into the United States from Mexico. Between
70 to 85% of Mexican immigrants that entered the United States since 1990 did not have valid
documentation in 2004.”).
124. Dr. Demetrios G. Papademetriou, President of the Migration Policy Institute, Address
before
the
Senate
Foreign
Relations
Committee
(Mar.
23,
2004),
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The most compelling flaw of the Secure Fence Act, which focuses
exclusively on increased border security, is that efforts to augment
border security will do nothing to remove or incorporate the twelve
million undocumented immigrants 125 who currently live and work
The mere existence of these
throughout the United States. 126
undocumented persons presents an obvious security challenge for the
U.S. government. 127 While mass deportation is often suggested as a
remedy to this problem, 128 realistically it is not an option that will
ameliorate the situation. 129
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/PapademetriouTestimony040323.pdf, at 3.
The
Congressional address identifies this critical failure in immigration policy: “it is Mexico’s (and to a
much lesser extent, Central America’s) tradition of circular migration that can be most accurately
described as having been most directly ‘disrupted’ by the US border enforcement policies of the
past 10 or so years.” Id.
125. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
126. See Brian R. Wahlquist, Note, Slamming the Door on Terrorists and the Drug Trade
While Increasing Legal Immigration: Temporary Deployment of the United States Military at the
Borders, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 551, 552 (2005) (“Border security and immigration are two separate
issues.”); see also Secure Fence Act Fact Sheet, supra note 117, at 2 (explaining that while
President Bush supported the increased border security measures, he made clear that it failed to
address the undocumented immigrants already in the country: “Comprehensive immigration reform
requires that we face the reality that millions of illegal immigrants are here already.”). See, e.g.,
H.R. 4437, 107th Cong. (2006) (noting this proposed legislation is just one of many attempts to
regulate immigration through law enforcement strategies). In addition to increased deportations, a
law enforcement strategy may also take an indirect approach via the employers who hire
undocumented immigrants. H.R. 4437 is an example of such combined efforts to stop illegal
immigration. This strategy reflects the push-pull philosophy of illegal immigration. See Senator
Alan K. Simpson, The Immigration Reform and Control Act: Immigration Policy and the National
Interest, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 147, 154-55 (1984). See also U.S. Immigration Policy:
Restoring Credibility, supra note 89. By closing off the forces that pull undocumented immigrants
into the country, legislators believe they can deter them from entering and/or staying in the United
States. Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social Security Protection Act of 2005: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. On Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the H. Comm. On the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 7 (2005) (statement of John N. Hostettler, Chairman) [hereinafter Illegal
Immigration Enforcement and Social Security Protection Act Hearing]. “The legislation is based
upon the understanding that we will only be able to assert control over illegal immigration when we
can turn off the ‘job magnet’ that draws most illegal aliens to our country. As almost half of all
illegal aliens resident in the U.S. came to the U.S. legally on temporary visas, border controls alone
will never be sufficient.” Id.
127. Tallman, supra note 80 at 890 (“Common sense dictates that integrating 9.3 million
undocumented, unknown immigrants into our society will address any existing national security
concerns regarding their presence. Introducing or passing legislation that seeks to limit their access
to services, benefits, or privileges does nothing in regards to knowing who they are or integrating
them into our society.”).
128. See Rajeen Goyle & David A. Jaeger, Deporting the Undocumented: A Cost Assessment
(Center for American Progress, Washington, D.C. 2005) at 1, available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/deporting_the_undocumented.pdf. The report prefaces the
findings by outlining the competing approaches on how to impact the number of undocumented
immigrants:
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Several practical problems restrict the government from actually
removing all undocumented immigrants from the United States. 130 The
geographic expanse of the country, the number of undocumented
immigrants present, and the limited financial resources available do not
permit an undertaking of such magnitude. 131 Even if undocumented
immigrants are returned to their home countries, they are likely to return
regardless of increased border security measures. 132
Developing a comprehensive solution to the rising population of
undocumented immigrants requires a compassionate understanding of
the root causes that feed the problem. 133 In addition to the disparity in

The political debate over immigration reform remains stymied over the question of
illegal immigration. . . . [r]esolving the status of the undocumented has become the
principal obstacle to achieving consensus on reform.
Most legislative proposals address the situation by providing some form of legal
recognition for the undocumented. Yet a number of people, including members of
Congress, favor a more draconian solution to the problem — a severe crackdown on
illegal immigration not only against those attempting to cross the border, but also the
deportation of the entire undocumented population currently living in the United States.
Id. at 1.
129. This
Month
in
Immigration
History:
May
1987,
http://149.101.23.2/graphics/aboutus/history/may1987.html. The United States Citizenship and
Immigration Service website describes mass deportation as an impractical solution to the
undocumented immigrant population:
At the beginning of the 21st Century, it is not at all clear that it is possible or even
desirable to try to find and then deport all undocumented migrants currently in the U.S.,
nor to adopt and then implement the stringent measures that would be needed to prevent
the continued arrival of additional undocumented aliens each year and deter others from
over-staying their legal authorizations.
Id.
130. Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Why Immigration Reform Requires a Comprehensive
Approach that Includes Both Legalization Programs and Provisions to Secure the Border, 43
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 267, 273 (2006) (projecting that it would take centuries for the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) to deport the entire population of undocumented immigrants
currently present in the country at the present rate of 3,000 appeals adjudicated per month and
acknowledging the limitations of the “already strained” immigration budget). Representative Sheila
Jackson Lee is the ranking member of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border
Security and Claims. Id. at 267, n. a1.
131. Id.; Goyle & Jaeger, supra note 128, at 1 (estimating the cost of a mass deportation at
$206-230 billion over five years). The report provides an objective analysis of the cost using
publicly available data. Id.
132. See Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social Security Protection Act Hearing, supra
note 126 and accompanying text. A vast number of undocumented immigrants are overstays who
entered legally, but failed to achieve legal status before their visas expired. Id.
133. U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, supra note 89. The Executive Summary
urges immigration reform to concentrate on the root causes of undocumented immigration:
Migrants enter and remain unlawfully in the United States for a variety of reasons. Few
migrants take the decision to leave their countries lightly. Generally, a combination of
"push" and "pull" factors contribute to these movements. Many of the recommendations
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wealth between the United States and the countries where undocumented
immigrants originate, 134 there is the problem of bureaucratic borders. 135
Any foreign national desiring to reside permanently in the United States
faces serious legal obstacles. 136
Even professional athletes and
multimillionaires face immigration challenges. 137 An immigration
system that remains difficult and unpredictable for this elite population
is even less approachable for economically dependent immigrants. 138
Processing an application for legal permanent residence is simply too
complicated and costly to realistically serve undocumented immigrants
as a credible alternative to unlawful border crossings or visa
overstays. 139

in this report aim to reduce the pull of both jobs and of ineffective immigration
enforcement. On the push side, lack of employment, low wages and poor working
conditions, separation from family members, political, social and religious repression,
civil conflict, and other problems motivate people to leave their homes. Any effective
strategy to prevent unlawful migration must address these causes.
Id. See also Amanda E. Schreyer, Note, Human Smuggling Across the U.S.-Mexico Border: U.S.
Laws Are Not Stopping It, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 795, 814 (2006) (opining that human smuggling
from Mexico to the United States must be addressed by focusing on the underlying causes).
134. Condon & McBride, supra note 90, at 256 (“There is significant evidence that additional
guest worker programs, as well as broad-based amnesties and legalization of illegal immigrants
already in the destination country, serve to stimulate further illegal immigration if there is not a
simultaneous and significant improvement of living standards in the originating country.”).
135. Benson, supra note 96, at 206 (“In part, our ‘illegal immigration’ problems result from the
prospective immigrant’s inability to understand and rely upon our legal immigration system.”).
136. See Raymond E. Wiest, External Dependency and the Perpetuation of Temporary
Migration in the United States, in PATTERNS OF UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION; MEXICO AND THE
UNITED STATES 110-35 (Richard C. Jones ed., 1984) (explaining how undocumented migration
perpetuates an economic dependency that feeds itself).
137. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(iii) (West 2006) (I.N.A. § 212) (outlining the complicated
set of restrictions on labor certification for professional athletes), and 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(b)(5)(A)
(West 2006) (I.N.A. § 203) (requiring a significant investment of capital and an assurance of job
creation for an immigrant investor visa); see also Ronald R. Rose, Fixing the Wheel: A Critical
Analysis of the Immigrant Investor Visa, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 615, 621 (1992) (explaining the
ineffectiveness of visas that target multimillionaire investors: “Less than ten percent of the available
visas are being issued.”).
138. See Yale-Loehr & Palmer, supra note 50, at 9 (guiding attorneys on unlawful presence
and concluding: “Unlawful presence remains as confusing as ever. Four years after enactment, the
INS still has not published implementing regulations to explain definitively when the three- and tenyear bars do and don’t apply. In the meantime, practitioners must muddle along, making do with
various memos and administrative cases they can find.”).
139. REFORMING IMMIGRATION; HELPING MEET AMERICA’S NEED FOR A SKILLED
WORKFORCE: A STATEMENT ON NATIONAL POLICY BY THE RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE OF
THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 2 (Committee for Economic Development 2001).
The report summarizes its findings on immigration policy by acknowledging that a failed system
creates a disincentive for immigrants to enter legally:
[T]he current permanent visa system, with its predominant emphasis on family
unification, fails to address our long-term workforce needs for permanent and higher
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Immigrants who risk their lives to cross the border without
inspection are usually reacting to an immediate economic need. 140
Compliance with extremely complicated and unpredictable immigration
laws 141 is not an option for immigrants who lack the financial means to
even begin the process. 142 For these immigrants the choice is not
whether to follow the law, but whether or not to enter. 143
Optimal immigration laws must take account of the effect they have
on illegal immigration. 144 If the laws themselves compel circumvention,
then lawmakers have a duty to correct these barriers. 145 Restrictionist
efforts to decrease the number of undocumented immigrants inflate the
problem by creating a more deeply subverted class of people
unrecognized by the law. 146
skilled workers. Administrative backlogs prevent the issuance of as much as half the
employment green cards authorized each year, forcing immigrants and employers alike
to turn to temporary visas as the makeshift rout to eventual permanent status. As a
result, both the permanent and temporary admission systems have become dysfunctional.
Employers and immigrants alike have strong incentives to ‘game the system’ instead of
playing by the rules.
Id.
140. See Simpson, supra note 126, at 154-55 (describing the “push” and “pull” factors that
drive illegal immigration). The main “push” factor that compels these immigrants to leave their
home countries are economic instability and a lack of jobs. Id. See also U.S. Immigration Policy:
Restoring Credibility, supra note 89 and accompanying text.
141. Yale-Loehr & Schoonmaker, supra note 37, at 73 (determining immigration to be one of
the most complicated areas of law, and adding that recent changes have sincerely increased the
complexity).
142. See James R. Edwards, Center for Immigration Studies, Two Sides of the Same Coin: The
Connection
Between
Legal
and
Illegal
Immigration
(2006),
available
at
http://www.cis.org/articles/2006/back106.html (noting that the estimated illegal immigration
population has tripled since 1980, in spite of the adoption of IRCA in 1986).
143. Benson, supra note 96, at 206 (“In part, our ‘illegal immigration’ problems result from the
prospective immigrant’s inability to understand and rely upon our legal immigration system.”).
144. Id.; see Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
41-42 (1984) (describing how our society’s values shape immigration law and delineating the rising
population of undocumented immigrants as a key issue influencing a policy shift: “Perhaps the
central fact about immigration with which social policymakers must deal today is the presence of an
immense population of aliens in the United States in apparent violation of the immigration laws.”).
145. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1982). See infra note 168 and accompanying
text (recognizing the existence of a “shadow population” as a violation of core democratic
principles); see also U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN
AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY (Report to Congress, 1997) 104,
available at http:// www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/becoming/full-report.pdf (providing guidance on the
direction of immigration policy: “As a nation committed to the rule of law, our immigration policies
must conform to the highest standards of integrity and efficiency in the enforcement of the law.”).
146. See Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform After
“9/11?”, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 332-33 (2003) (citing IIRIRA to demonstrate the
undesirable outcome of increasing immigration restrictions: “[I]mmigration legislation has taken a
decidedly restrictionist position, resulting in the institutionalization of a permanent class of ‘illegal’
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Although motivated by different objectives, the U.S. government,
U.S. citizens, and undocumented immigrants themselves share a
common desire to decrease the population of persons deemed “illegal” in
the United States. 147 Given the common purpose of these interest
groups, the question of whether to allow the present population of
undocumented immigrants to legalize status must be fairly addressed. 148
While critics of legalization are firmly grounded in the moral obligation
to punish undocumented immigrants, 149 a pragmatic approach
recognizes that the immigrants themselves need an incentive to come out
of the shadows. 150 Comprehensive immigration reform measures
attempt to balance these competing objectives by incorporating
punishment mechanisms alongside the benefit of adjusting status. 151
While lawmakers have full discretion to expand or retract

persons and placing them outside protection of the law.”).
147. Hearing on How Illegal Immigration Impacts Constituencies: Perspectives From
Members of Congress (Part II) Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 40 (2005), at 2 [hereinafter Hearing on How Illegal
Immigration Impacts Constituencies, Part II] (statement of Rep. John N. Hostettler, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security and Claims, New Mexico) (“I think the members of
Congress can agree on one thing on this issue: The illegal alien situation must be brought under
control.”).
148. See Hearing on Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, supra note 64, at 9 (statement of Rep.
Berman) (urging the necessity of a legalization measure: “[w]ithout some process that deals with the
legalization of the millions and millions of people in this country now working, and working under
false identifiers, working in many cases in outrageously inhumane conditions, unless some process
exists for them to come forward, that kind of a system will never work.”).
149. Marah Carter Stith, Immigration Control: A Catholic Dilemma?, 84 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 73, 93 (2007) (relating the desire to punish as a religious ideal: “they may wish to restrict
benefits to undocumented aliens in order to discourage illegal immigration.”).
150. See Neda Mahmoudzadeh, Comment, Love Them, Love Them Not: The Reflection of AntiImmigrant Attitudes in Undocumented Immigrant Health Care Law, 9 SCHOLAR 465, 494 (2007)
(addressing the denial of health care to undocumented immigrants and concluding: “For national
security purposes, it is crucial to keep count of all non-citizens that enter or are within the United
States border. However, further isolation and criminalization of those who live in this country
illegally will certainly not help the process of identifying them.”). Coercive measures designed to
propel voluntary departures have historically proven to be the most effective and efficient means of
decreasing the undocumented immigrant population. Ehrenpreis, supra note 90, at 1221
(recommending that immigration laws encourage undocumented immigrants to leave willingly:
“[t]he most effective way to control illegal immigration is to truly eliminate the pull factor –
employment opportunities.”).
151. See Dennis J. Loiacono & Jillian Maloff, Note, Be Our Guest: Synthesizing a Realistic
Guest Worker Program as an Element of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 111, 143 (2007). The authors attempt to synthesize various approaches to the current
debate. In concluding that “[a] comprehensive solution is essential to effective and fair immigration
reform,” the term “comprehensive” appears to be used as a term of art that means a combination of
enforcement along with legalization. Id.
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immigration benefits as they see fit, 152 constructing a workable
immigration system requires creating laws that serve their intended
purpose. 153 A complicated and costly immigration bureaucracy that
drives illegal immigration is counterproductive 154 and not in the best
interest of our society. 155
Comprehensive immigration reform acknowledges and addresses
the interdependent relationship between legal and illegal immigration. 156

152. Contra MICHAEL DUMMETT, ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES 46 (Routledge 2001)
(arguing that all nations have an affirmative duty to grant immigration benefits to migrants who
enter due to economic necessity: “the idea that its duty is only to its citizens stems from a faulty
conception of the purpose of the state’s existence . . . .”).
153. Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 252 (2003) (illustrating the
ineffectiveness of immigration through a comparison to prohibition: “In sum, strict immigration
controls that run counter to migration pressures simply cannot be enforced. As Prohibition has
shown, law cannot be effectively enforced when it faces social and economic resistance and the
governed do not view as criminal what the law criminalizes. Moreover, rampant violation of the
immigration laws undermines their very legitimacy.”); Jennifer Bosco, Comment, Undocumented
Immigrants, Economic Justice, and Welfare Reform in California, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 71, 89-90
(1994) (identifying the futility of immigration laws when there are strong incentives to immigrate
illegally: “without addressing the factors that push people to immigrate illegally, any immediate
legal remedies will not be fully effective.”).
154. See Katherine L. Vaughns, Symposium: Broken Fences: Legal and Practical Realities of
Immigration Reform in the Post-9/11 Age: Restoring the Rule of Law: Reflections on Fixing the
Immigration System and Exploring Failed Policy Changes, 5 U. MD. J. RACE, RELIG., GENDER &
CLASS 151, 167 (2005) (addressing the ineffectiveness of current immigration policy: “At present,
the legislative initiatives enacted since 1996 have rendered immigration laws so harsh and tough, it
is not surprising that they are hard to enforce and virtually ignored.”).
155. See Bosco, supra note 153, at 81 (arguing that U.S. immigration policy must compensate
for the unintended effects of the disparity in wealth).
The United States must also bear responsibilities that go beyond national borders.
Economic development within the United States frequently has a disastrous effect on the
natural resources and the stability of so-called developing nations. Political philosopher
Judith Lichtenberg argues that we owe an affirmative duty to those whom we make
worse off: ‘[I]t has been persuasively argued that economic underdevelopment is,
paradoxically, in part a result of economic development; for the transformation to a
modern economy, in which the developed nations and the multinational corporations
have had a crucial role, erodes traditional means of livelihood for much of the rural
population of the developing nations. To the extent that this is so, many (perhaps a
majority) of those in the developing nations are absolutely harmed by relations with
advanced countries.’
Id. (quoting Judith Lichtenberg, National Boundaries and Moral Boundaries: A Cosmopolitan
View, in BOUNDARIES, NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITS 79, 91 (1981).).
156. See generally ISBISTER, supra note 84, at 201 (finding that illegal immigration is an
inevitable product of regulating immigration: “As long as the United States places any restrictions at
all on immigration, it will automatically have undocumented immigrants.” ). See also Simpson,
supra note 126, at 154-55 (1984) (endorsing IRCA as a co-sponsor of the legislation by detailing the
connection between illegal and legal immigration). Senator Simpson’s disdain for illegal
immigration focuses on how it hinders legal immigration: “illegal immigration endangers a fair and
generous policy of legal immigration . . . .” Id. See also POWELL, supra note 87, at 154 (citing the
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The notion of forgiving previous wrongs is a central element in many
Rather than castigate
comprehensive reform initiatives. 157
undocumented immigrants with costly deportation programs,
comprehensive reform focuses on viable solutions. 158
IV. AMNESTY AS A POLITICIZED TERM
The strongest criticism that Section 245(i) has received is the label
of amnesty. 159 Appreciating the argument against readopting this
measure requires a full understanding of the political stigma that attaches
to an amnesty provision. 160
At the onset, Section 245(i) received little attention because it was
not yet deemed an amnesty provision. 161 Because the meaning of the

relationship between legal and illegal immigration as a central tenet of a comprehensive approach:
“As international migration becomes more common and terrorism a greater threat, the study of
illegal immigration will become increasingly important to a comprehensive understanding of the
nature and process of immigration.”).
157. See Vaughns, supra note 154, at 182 (arguing for comprehensive immigration reform: “A
regularization or legalization component, however, is critical to a major overhaul of the immigration
system.”).
158. Goyle & Jaeger, supra note 128, at 9 (revealing the impracticability of mass deportation:
“The cost assessment in this report hopefully illustrates the false allure of adopting a mass
deportation policy as a response to the challenges threatening our immigration system.”).
159. See JON E. DOUGHERTY, ILLEGALS: THE IMMINENT THREAT POSED BY OUR UNSECURED
U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 228-29 (WND Books 2004) (labeling Section 245(i) as amnesty and
expressing strong disdain for the general concept of legalization). Hearings in the House over
comprehensive immigration reform acknowledged that using the term amnesty distracts from the
issue: “what we have is a country that is up in arms about the fact that there is an amnesty bill out
there and no real decent, considered, thoughtful conversation and discussion about what we do to
deal with the problem of immigration in this country.” Hearing on Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants,
supra note 64, at 18 (statement of Rep. Waters, Member, H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration,
Border Security and Claims).
160. It Isn’t Amnesty, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2006, at A22 (commenting on S. 2611 and
relating the political consequences of attaching the word amnesty to a proposed piece of legislation:
“Attackers of a smart, tough Senate bill have smeared it with the most mealy-mouthed word in the
immigration glossary – amnesty – in hopes of rendering it politically toxic.”).
161. See Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 4603, Departments of
Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Aug. 26,
1994) (referencing the effect the Act would have on illegal immigration without commenting on
Section 245(i)). The portion of the President’s statement relating to immigration, in its entirety, is
as follows:
The Act will enable the Justice Department to escalate its efforts to secure the border and
to control illegal immigration. Resources are provided to expand the number of agents at
high-risk crossing points to deter illegal immigration, improve the equipment available
to agents to increase their effectiveness, expedite deportations of criminal illegal aliens,
and increase asylum adjudications. The Act also provides, for the first time, a funding
source to help States that are burdened by large numbers of criminal illegal aliens in their
prisons. This $130 million initiative highlights the Federal Government’s commitment
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term “amnesty” varies depending on one’s political stance, the question
of whether Section 245(i) is an amnesty provision becomes a threshold
legal question for anyone hoping to readopt the measure. 162
Amnesty is perhaps the most controversial term in the immigration
lexicon. 163 For many the term signifies a complete forgiveness of illegal
immigration. 164 The concept compels harsh criticism from those who
feel that it would unfairly reward illegal entry. 165 Implicit in this
argument is the concern for how condoning illegal immigration may
taint the legitimacy and efficacy of legal immigration. 166
On the other hand, for undocumented immigrants and their families
immigration reform that includes amnesty provides a glimmer of hope
that their lives may eventually stabilize. 167 Undocumented populations
in the United States are for the most part resigned to live in the shadows
of society. 168 Given that no provision of law currently allows

to share the responsibility for reducing the fiscal impact of illegal immigration with
affected States.
Id.
162. Reid-Kennedy Hearing, supra note 11, at 6 (statement by F. James Sensenbrenner,
Chairman, H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security and Claims). Chairman
Sensenbrenner opened the proceedings by cautioning the Representatives: “This is a very emotional
subject, there are going to be some statements that are made that people enthusiastically agree with
or violently disagree with.” Id.
163. See Mark Krikorian, Amnesty, in English; The Debate Over Amnesty Ought to be Waged
in Plain English, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, D.C.,
2001), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-krikorian090401.html
(acknowledging the political ramifications of using the word amnesty and criticizing lawmakers for
using euphemisms rather than utter the term).
164. John L. Martin, The Five Years War: Public Safety v. Special Interests, (Fed’n for
American Immigr. Reform, Washington, D.C, 2005), at 2-3, available at
http://www.fairus.org/site/DocServer/911report.pdf?docID=1141 (last visited Feb. 2, 2007)
(rejecting the “earned legalization” and “out of the shadows” justifications for amnesty); The
Amnesty Trap, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 2006, at A22 (explaining why some Senators were unwilling to
support an amnesty provision: “[a]nything other than punishment and border enforcement smacks
unforgivably of forgiveness.”).
165. Mayerle, supra note 45, at 576 (chronicling the criticisms of proposed guest worker
programs: “[a] principal argument against both of the amnesty options is that they reward
individuals that have committed a crime by entering the country illegally.”).
166. See generally, supra note 156 and accompanying text.
167. Guzman, supra note 12, at 135 (humanizing the immigration debate with examples of
how legalization affects immigrants personally and affirming: “With a legalization program similar
to the 1986 IRCA program, many immigrants who now seem without hope, will have a chance to
gain permanent residency.”).
168. Hearing on Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, supra note 102 and accompanying text. The
U.S. Supreme Court defined the undocumented immigration population in these terms and
expressed a compassionate plea for justice on their behalf in Plyler v. Doe:
Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this country, coupled
with the failure to establish an effective bar to the employment of undocumented aliens,

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 5
SIEGEL_FINAL

322

3/23/2009 2:25 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:291

undocumented immigrants to legalize their status, any discussion of
amnesty is eagerly embraced by these populations and those who rely on
their presence. 169
Amnesty, as it is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, addresses
“political offenses with respect to which forgiveness is deemed more
expedient for the public welfare than prosecution and punishment. 170
For those who strongly oppose amnesty, accepting it as a necessary evil
to a vexing problem is not an easy choice to make, 171 especially when
previous amnesty attempts have failed and produced lasting
consequences. 172 Nonetheless, a blanket refusal to consider any
provision of law that resembles amnesty blindly forecloses realistic
solutions. 173
While a true amnesty, like the one enacted in 1986, has the

has resulted in the creation of a substantial ‘shadow population’ of illegal migrants-numbering in the millions--within our borders. This situation raises the specter of a
permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as
a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes
available to citizens and lawful residents. The existence of such an underclass presents
most difficult problems for a Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of
equality under law.
457 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1982).
169. See, e.g., Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Proceedings and
Debates of the 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002) 148 CONG. REC. S2,916-01, S2,929 [hereinafter
Enhanced Border Security Act] (statement by Sen. Tom Daschle, South Dakota) (“I remain strongly
committed to a meaningful 245(i) extension-one that gives long-time, tax-paying residents a
genuine opportunity to remain in this country-with their families-while they wait to become
permanent legal residents.”); see also Interfaith Statement in Support of Comprehensive
Immigration
Reform,
October
14,
2005
available
at
http://www.justiceforimmigrants.org/files/Interfaith%20Statement.pdf (endorsing an amnesty
provision on behalf of a wide range of organizations and community leaders).
We call on our elected officials to enact legislation that includes…[a]n opportunity for
hard-working immigrants who are already contributing to this country to come out of the
shadows, regularize their status upon satisfaction of reasonable criteria and, over time,
pursue an option to become lawful permanent residents and eventually United States
citizens.
Id.
170. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (8th ed. 2004).
171. Frei, supra note 41, at 1388 (“The main concern voiced by conservatives has been over
what Republicans perceive as an amnesty component to the President’s plan, effectively rewarding
illegal aliens for their unlawful presence in the United States.”).
172. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (demonstrating how criticism of IRCA
shapes the current amnesty debate).
173. Reid-Kennedy Hearing, supra note 11, at 22 (prepared statement by Alan K. Simpson,
former U.S. Sen., Wyoming) (acknowledging the perils of enacting an amnesty provision, but
finding it to be a necessary consideration: “History shows us . . . that relying on attrition alone will
not be successful for the majority of this cohort. Some form of amnesty must therefore at least be
considered, for practical reasons if for no other.”).
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potential to cause more problems than it solves, 174 a more subtle attempt
to soften immigration laws should be considered as an experimental
middle-ground alternative. 175
The all-or-nothing approach 176 to
immigration, which has driven politics for the last quarter century, 177 has
proven itself to be unworkable. 178 Effective immigration reform
requires some compromise between punishing undocumented
immigrants and uncovering their existence. 179
V. REJECTING AMNESTY: PRESIDENT BUSH’S STANCE
President Bush’s explicit condemnation of amnesty reflects the
severe political consequences of proposing any concept that may be
labeled as such. 180 In his radio address on April 8, 2006 the President

174. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (discussing IRCA).
175. President George W. Bush, Pres. Messages, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N.
D60, at 3 (“There is a rational middle ground between granting an automatic path to citizenship for
every illegal immigrant, and a program of mass deportation.”).
176. Meissner, supra note 84. The 1990’s was an era of political extremism in nearly all facets
of government, including immigration policy. Id. Immigration laws enacted in the 1990’s reflect
this perspective: “We have all experienced a period of tremendous polarization on too many issues
including immigration.” Id.
177. See, e.g., Reimers, supra note 11 (explaining the trend of restrictive immigration positions
among voters in the United States between 1970-1998: “As revealed in public opinion polls, when
immigration increased and changed Americans reasserted their traditional ambivalence or hostility
toward immigrants”).
178. Reid-Kennedy Hearing, supra note 11, at 90 (statement by Chairman F. James
Sensenbrenner, Wisconsin) (“I’m afraid that a lot of what has gone on this year in terms of the
public discourse on immigration on both sides of the question has further polarized the public. And
instead of going toward the middle, we have gone further apart. And that’s going to make our job
as elected representatives of the people a lot more difficult in terms of reaching something that can
get a majority vote in both the House and the Senate and the President’s signature . . . .”).
179. See
Comprehensive
Immigration
Reform,
http://www.aila.org/issues/issue.aspx?docid=18635 (last visited January 21, 2007) (giving the
American Immigration Lawyer’s Association recommendations for immigration reform).
AILA believes that any workable immigration reform proposal must be comprehensive.
Specifically, it must simultaneously create legal avenues for people to enter the U.S.;
allow people already here an opportunity to earn legal status; address backlogs in family
and employment-based immigration; and create and implement a smart border security
and enforcement regime.
Id.
180. See Carl Hulse & Jim Rutenberg, Senate Passes Two Immigration Measures, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 2006, at A25 (quoting Representative F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., Republican of
Wisconsin, in his blanket refusal to consider President Bush’s approach to immigration reform:
“[r]egardless of what the president says, what he is proposing is amnesty”); see also Germain, supra
note 90, at 749-50 (“The President and his advisors were careful to avoid any mention of the ‘A’
word or ‘Amnesty.’ This word is taboo for anyo [sic] proposing any sort of immigration reform, so
it is often referred to using other names.”).
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proposed a temporary worker program. 181 In his discussion he clarified
repeatedly that his plan specifically rejected amnesty. 182 Nonetheless,
those who stand firmly against any notion of amnesty are critical of
President Bush’s position. 183
In May of 2001 President Bush wrote to Congress in an effort to
save Section 245(i). 184 In his plea to extend the provision for those
undocumented immigrants who were eligible, but missed the deadline,
he advised Congress that “[i]t remains in our national interest to
legitimize those resident immigrants, eligible for legal status, and to
welcome them as full participants of our society.” 185 The immigrants
whom President Bush referred to were immigrants who had either
entered illegally or overstayed their visas, and then remained in the
United States for years without legal status. 186
Political opponents have heavily criticized President Bush for
supporting legalization statutes such as Section 245(i), while rejecting
Such critics assert that President Bush’s hard-line
amnesty. 187
convictions against amnesty are deceptive. 188 In 2006 President Bush
appeared to make his position on amnesty clear to the American people:
A new temporary worker program should not provide amnesty.

181. President George W. Bush, President’s Radio Address, The White House, Office of
Commc’ns, at 1 (Apr. 8, 2006) [hereinafter President Bush’s Radio Address] (recommending a
three-part plan for comprehensive immigration reform that would include increased border security,
enhanced law enforcement, and finally a temporary worker program). This excerpt is one of many
speeches President Bush has given in support of a guest worker program. See, e.g., President Bush
Proposes
New
Temporary
Worker
Program,
(Jan.
7,
2004),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-3.html.
182. Id. at 1-2 (President Bush dismissed amnesty in the first sentence of his guest worker
proposal: “comprehensive immigration reform must include a temporary worker program that
relieves pressure on our borders, while rejecting amnesty.”). While President Bush had previously
urged Congress to adopt a guest worker program that would include a legalization component, this
proposal clearly rejected any form of legalization. Id.
183. Buchanan, supra note 11, at 252 (“Though President Bush may declare, ‘I oppose
amnesty!’ every time he speaks, his guest worker program is amnesty, both for the illegals and for
the businesses that hired them.”).
184. President Bush’s Letter to Congress, supra note 72.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Krikorian, supra note 127 (criticizing similar statements that President Bush made in
2001: “In August, President Bush said, ‘There's going to be no amnesty,’ though he immediately
contradicted himself by saying he favors a plan ‘that will legalize the hard work that's taking place
now in America.’”); see also William Norman Grigg, The United States Should Not Legalize Illegal
Immigrants, in IMMIGRATION (Louise I. Gerdes ed., Thomson Gale 2005), at 114-21 (strongly
criticizing President Bush for supporting a legalization approach and finding his position on
amnesty to be deceptive).
188. Id.
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Granting amnesty would be unfair to those who follow the rules and
obey the laws. Amnesty would also be unwise, because it would
encourage others to break the law and create new waves of illegal
immigration. We must ensure that those who break our laws are not
granted an automatic path to citizenship. 189

There are two ways to interpret President Bush’s seemingly
contradictory statements concerning amnesty. One would be to draw no
distinction, and conclude that President Bush’s endorsement of Section
245(i) is entirely consistent with his firm stance against amnesty. 190 The
other approach would be to find that his position necessarily contradicts
itself by condemning amnesty, and then endorsing it at the same time. 191
Amnesty opponents argue that if President Bush were against
amnesty then he would not have encouraged Congress to legitimize
undocumented immigrants by any means. 192 Meanwhile amnesty
proponents contend either that Section 245(i) is not amnesty, or if it is
amnesty, it was harmless with respect to the issues raised by President
Bush, and therefore constituted an “amnesty” far different from any
legalization proposed today.
VI. LEGALIZATION VERSUS AMNESTY
The conflicting interpretations of amnesty assume different
definitions of the term. In one sense the term “amnesty” represents any
provision which would allow undocumented immigrants to become legal
residents. 193 This approach frames amnesty as any law which does not
effectively punish the undocumented immigrant population. 194 Anti-

189. President’s Radio Address, supra note 134.
190. See, e.g., MICHAEL C. LEMAY, U.S. IMMIGRATION: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 33 (ABCCLIO, Inc. 2004) (recapitulating Bush’s policy as entirely against legalization: “The administration
of President George W. Bush opposes legalization, favoring instead achieving some migration
accord with Mexico and perhaps an expanded guest-worker program.”). While the text provides
information on Section 245(i) and other legalization programs, there is no mention of President
Bush’s endorsement. Id. at 32-34, 73-75, 175.
191. See Krikorian, supra note 127 (accusing the Bush administration of deceptively
supporting amnesty, but calling it by a different term: “there's been a mad rush to come up with
alternative descriptions for what is plainly an amnesty.”).
192. Hulse & Rutenberg, supra note 42 (quoting Republican Senator Tom Coburn as saying
“[w]hether they say it is amnesty or not, it is amnesty when somebody here illegally gets a path to
citizenship without going back to their home country”).
193. See id. (providing insight on Republican skepticism of amnesty: “[Senator Saxby
Chambliss, Republican of Georgia] and other Republicans said Mr. Bush’s plan would be viewed as
amnesty by many Americans, even if illegal immigrants had to pay fines and meet other
requirements, because they would still be rewarded with legal status.”).
194. For a criticism of this approach see Jacoby, supra note 97, at 113. Jacoby provides
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immigrant lobbyists generally define the term in this over-inclusive
manner. 195 Those who approach undocumented immigrants with
condemnation reject amnesties on the grounds that they encourage
unlawful activity. 196
A narrow construction of amnesty distinguishes between a law that
serves alternative policy objectives and one that merely forgives the
evasion of immigration laws. 197 Under this approach, a law allowing
undocumented immigrants to legalize their status is only considered
amnesty when it rewards illegal entry by removing all sanctions. 198 This
more specific interpretation of amnesty differentiates the negative
connotation of rewarding the offense from the practical, efficient
enforcement of immigration laws. 199
impassioned commentary on why this political stance is ineffective:
Conservatives who criticize the Bush proposal as an unprincipled ‘amnesty’ assume that
there are alternatives—that we can simply crack down harder on the border and enforce
any quota we like, no matter how unrealistic. But we can’t. Mexican workers want to
fill jobs in the United States, and they will continue to find ways to enter the country.
Without immigration reform, it will be business as usual on our southern frontier: more
futile law enforcement, more migrant deaths, and more crime.
Id.
195. See, e.g., DIRK CHASE ELDREDGE, CROWDED LAND OF LIBERTY 82 (Bridge Works
Publishing 2001) (strongly criticizing any notion of amnesty: “Amnesty for illegals in this country
should be renamed ‘acquiescence.’”).
196. Id. at 83 (finding amnesty to encourage undocumented immigration: “amnesty actually
invites further illegal immigration. It sends the message to potential illegal immigrants everywhere
that America is not really serious about keeping you out, so come on in, keep a low profile for a few
years, and another amnesty will soon appear on the horizon.”); Rachel L. Swarns, House Negotiator
Calls Senate Immigration Bill “Amnesty’’ and Rejects It, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2006, at A9 (quoting
Representative F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., Republican of Wisconsin and chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, as saying “Amnesty is wrong because it rewards someone for illegal
behavior.”).
197. The debate over whether 245(i) constitutes amnesty illustrates this ideological conflict.
Compare, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 83 (“Section 245(i) does not provide amnesty to immigrants”)
with Numbers USA, http://www.numbersusa.com/interests/amnesty_print.html (last visited Jan. 14,
2006) (an anti-immigration website listing Section 245(i) and the two extensions of the provision as
amnesties) and, Border Security and Immigration Issues Hearing, supra note 43, at 5 (labeling
Section 245(i) as “rolling amnesty” and stating that it was “responsible for legalizing at least 1.5
million illegal aliens”).
198. Pro-immigrant advocates argue that a legalization program does not constitute amnesty
when it requires some form of quid pro quo in exchange for the benefit of adjusting status. See
President George W. Bush, Pres. Messages, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. D60, at 3-4
(distinguishing a proposed legalization program from amnesty: “I believe that illegal immigrants
who have roots in our country and want to stay should have to pay a meaningful penalty for
breaking the law, to pay their taxes, to learn English, and to work in a job for a number of years.
People who meet these conditions should be able to apply for citizenship, but approval would not be
automatic and they will have to wait in line behind those who played by the rules and followed the
law. What I’ve just described is not amnesty . . . .”).
199. Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss1/5

36

Siegel: Amnesty in Immigration Policy
SIEGEL_FINAL

2008]

3/23/2009 2:25 PM

AMNESTY IN IMMIGRATION POLICY

327

The hard-line approach, which refuses any form of relief to
undocumented immigrants, was recently articulated by James R.
Edwards, Jr. in his presentation to the House of Representatives at a
2006 hearing on immigration reform. 200 According to Edwards, any
relief afforded to these immigrants in obtaining legal status would
amount to amnesty: 201 “As a rule, amnesties should be employed
sparingly and carefully. They indeed do affront the rule of law because
amnesty is an act whereby the civil government overlooks lawbreaking.
Amnesty in effect rewards lawbreakers for their lawbreaking. Amnesty
Edwards’ approach to amnesty
lets off certain lawbreakers.” 202
represents one side of a heated debate, that of strict opposition against
any provision of law that would allow undocumented immigrants to
legalize status. 203 This approach rejects a central component of
comprehensive immigration reform, and opts instead for enforcementonly. 204
On the other side of the debate are those who support a legalization
process. 205 While there is a strong tendency to define amnesty as

200. Border Security and Immigration Issues Hearing, supra note 43. Edwards testified on
Senate Bill S. 2611. Id. He compared the bill to the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(“IRCA”) and found both pieces of legislation to be amnesties. Id.
201. Id. (“the legalization provisions in S. 2611 and similar arrangements in other legislation
can only be described as amnesty”).
202. Id. at 3 (Edwards’ strong disdain for amnesty is evident in his connections between illegal
and legal immigration: “amnesty of illegal aliens rewards their dishonorable, disorderly, lawless
conduct in a highly public manner that effectively insults legal immigrants.”). The notion that
amnesty rewards lawbreakers is the dominant argument used by critics to oppose such legislation.
See Mayerle, supra note 45; see also Frei, supra note 41.
203. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 11, at 252 (projecting a strong anti-amnesty stance that
pronounces President Bush’s guest worker plans as deceptive amnesties).
204. For criticism on the enforcement-only approach see National Immigration Law Center,
Enforcement-only approach to immigration reform will give boost to the most unscrupulous
employers, EJC & NILC testify, 20 IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS UPDATE (2006), available at
http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/CIR/cir018.htm. The article summarizes the Congressional
testimony of Bill Beardall: “If anything, the U.S.'s experience with the provisions of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 have taught us that an enforcement-only approach
actually creates incentives for employers to hire unauthorized workers . . . .” Id. Beardall’s actual
testimony states: “The enforcement-without-reform policy of the last 20 years, including the
initiation of employer sanctions, has been a resounding and obvious failure.” Field Hearing on
Immigration: Enforcing Employee Work Eligibility Laws and Implementing a Stronger Employment
Verification System, Before the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the H. Comm. on
Education and the Workforce, 109th Cong 2 (2006) (statement of Bill Beardall, Executive Director,
Equal Justice Center); see also Gallegos, supra note 29, at 1772-73 (providing examples to illustrate
the ineffectiveness of an enforcement-only approach: “Because current laws are inadequate,
heightened enforcement may compound already existing harms.”).
205. See, e.g., It Isn’t Amnesty, supra note 160, at A22 (supporting S. 2611’s proposed
legalization provision: “Senate Judiciary Committee under its chairman, Arlen Specter, has
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Edwards has, advocates of a legalization process often do not consider
their proposals to constitute amnesty. 206 For these supporters illegal
entries or stays in the United States are not necessarily crimes that need
to be punished by a denial of immigration benefits. 207
While the illegal entry and stay are clear violations of the INA, 208
the question of whether to punish such violations need not presume
approved [a] smart, tough immigration that does not, as its detractors charge, confer amnesty on
[an] estimated 12 million people living in [the] country illegally; [the] bill addresses enforcement,
but also, unlike [the] House counterpart, takes on [the] hard job of trying to sort out immigrants who
want to stay and follow rules from those who do not.”).
206. Id. (defending S. 2611 against the title of amnesty: “[t]he path to citizenship laid out by
the Specter bill wouldn’t be easy. It would take 11 years, a clean record, a steady job, payment of a
$2,000 fine and back taxes, and knowledge of English and civics. That’s not ‘amnesty,’ with its
suggestion of getting something for nothing”); but see Martin, supra note 164, at 6 (characterizing
S. 2611 as amnesty regardless of what criteria the bill requires undocumented immigrants to fulfill
as preconditions to legalization). Perhaps the most well-known spokesman for this position is
President George W. Bush. Fact Sheet: Fair and Secure Immigration Reform, (Jan. 7, 2004),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/print/20040107-1.html). At various
stages in his presidency, Bush encouraged Congress to enact legislation that would allow
undocumented immigrants to legalize their status. See, e.g, id. While promoting measures which
critics would deplore as amnesty, the President’s statements and press releases affirmatively
rejected any notion of amnesty. Id. In 2004, President Bush proposed a temporary guest worker
program for the population of undocumented immigrants then-present in the United States. Id. The
press release for this guest worker initiative described a legalization program that would apply to
“undocumented men and women,” while disclaiming “President Bush does not support amnesty . . .
.” Id. In 2006, President Bush proposed a similar temporary worker program as part of his
Comprehensive Immigration Reform plan. Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Immigration Reform:
Securing Our Border, Enforcing Our Laws, and Upholding Our Values (Mar. 2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060327-1.html. Although this suggestion
differed from the earlier proposal enough to appear less like amnesty, the President’s release
asserted that it was not amnesty five times. Id.
207. Amnesty provisions would change the law itself, rather than create an exception to the
law. See Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 964 (11th Cir. 1984) (advancing the wide latitude that
Congress has to design immigration laws) (citing Chae Chan Ping v. U.S. (The Chinese Exclusion
Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure §
2.2a (rev. 1982); cf. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (noting that powers of
the federal government with regard to aliens are more limited outside the immediate context of
regulating entry: “there are apparently no limitations on the power of the federal government to
determine what classes of aliens will be permitted to enter the United States or what procedures will
be used to determine their admissibility.”).
208. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (West 2005) (I.N.A. § 237) (stating the consequence of
unlawful presence: “Any alien who is present in the United States in violation of this chapter or any
other law of the United States, or whose nonimmigrant visa (or other documentation authorizing
admission into the United States as a nonimmigrant) has been revoked under section 1201(i) of this
title is deportable”); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (West 2005) (I.N.A. § 212) (defining an illegal
entrant: “An alien present in the United States without being paroled, or who arrives in the United
States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible”); 8
U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (West 2005) (I.N.A. § 237) (stating the consequence of unlawful entry:
“Any alien who at the time of entry or adjustment of status was within one or more of the classes of
aliens inadmissible by the law existing at such time is deportable.”).
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amnesty. 209
Contrary to the criticism that amnesties “reward
lawbreakers” 210 and “allow illegal immigrants to cut in line,” most
legalization proposals impose significant penalties for having initially
broken the law, and require beneficiaries to earn the privilege to adjust
status on a schedule behind that of non-lawbreaking applicants. 211
VII. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Absent from the recent debates on immigration reform has been any
discussion of reenacting Section 245(i) of the INA. 212 Reincorporating
this simple piece of legislation 213 presents a workable resolution to the

209. Hearing on Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, supra note 64. Representative Jackson Lee
took issue with the premise of the hearing, as she refuted the label of amnesty for S. 2611: “the
question of this hearing uses the word ‘amnesty,’ which has been infused with negative
connotations by the opponents of the Senate’s bill, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of
2006, S. 2611. The Senate bill in fact would not grant amnesty.” Id. at 4.
210. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Judicial Review of Amnesty Denials: Must Aliens Bet Their
Lives to Get Into Court?, 25 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 53, 54 (1990) (characterizing IRCA’s
amnesty as a reward: “The amnesty provision is generous and liberal, essentially rewarding those
who have violated United States law for at least six years.”).
211. See, e.g., Hearing on How Illegal Immigration Impacts Constituencies, Part II, supra note
147, at 39 (statement of Rep. Gutierrez, Witness, Illinois). In his presentation urging Congress to
enact a legalization provision, Mr. Gutierrez identified the full extent of sanctions that
undocumented immigrants are willing to endure before earning legal status:
Let’s fine them a thousand five hundred bucks . . . . Let’s put them in to a program for 7
years and say you don’t get anything for 7 years unless you work, you pay taxes, you
follow all the laws. Let’s put them into indentured servitude programs, but let’s give
them hope at the end of the day that after they’ve proven to us, they already are hardworking, committed people to America, that we say at the end of the day, okay, you’ve
earned it. You get to join the rest of us, as our history has always allowed us to do in our
immigration policy. So I join the Congresswoman in seeking that earned legalization.
Id.
212. Compare President George W. Bush, Remarks to the City Club of Cleveland and a
Question-and-Answer Session in Cleveland, Ohio, 42 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL
DOCUMENTS 12 (March 27, 2006) (averting the issue entirely when asked directly about his position
on extending Section 245(i)) and President Bush’s Letter to Congress, supra note 72.and
accompanying text (demonstrating President Bush’s enthusiastic support for reenacting Section
245(i) in 2002). In 2006 two bills were introduced that would have extended Section 245(i), but
neither prompted a debate in Congress. See Rep. Rangel Introduces Effort to Ease Path to
Permanent Residency, US FED NEWS, June 30, 2006, (Rep. Charles B. Rangel, New York,
introduced H.R. 5741 on June 29, 2006, which would have reenacted Section 245(i)) and Rep.
Cleaver Introduces Bill to Amend U.S. Immigration Emanuel Cleaver, US FED NEWS, July 12,
2006, (Rep. Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri, introduced H.R. 5747 on July 10, 2006 to extend Section
245(i)).
213. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (providing the full text of the law as stated in
the INA); compare Stephen Yale-Loehr & Daniel M. Kowalski, Cut Through the Noise: Key Trends
in
Immigration
Law,
Miller
Mayer,
attorneys
at
law,
available
at
http://www.millermayer.com/new/key_trends.html (last visited January 22, 2007).
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current impasse. 214 Because it is a relatively straightforward and timetested alternative to enacting a complicated new law, 215 Section 245(i)
could potentially alleviate some of the United States’ post 9/11 security
concerns, by allowing certain undocumented immigrants to become
official, registered residents. 216
Reenacting Section 245(i) presents a viable solution to the current
amnesty debate because the Act serves competing objectives. 217 First,
the provision has proven to be an effective means for undocumented
immigrants to legalize status. 218 Legalization is only effective when the
potential beneficiaries trust the system enough to come forward out of
the shadows. 219 While in effect between 1994 and 2001, Section 245(i)

214. See generally Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Amnesty, supra note 4 (explaining the origin,
significance and practical usage of INA Section 245 in the practice of law); see also Lofgren, supra
note 61 and accompanying text (stating her personal recollection that the House of Representatives
did not discuss Section 245(i) when it was reenacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act).
215. Yale-Loehr & Kowalski, supra note 213. Immigration practitioners have characterized S.
2611 as an exacerbation of the existing problems because it adds complexity:
This complexity will only increase if Congress enacts immigration reform. The bill the
U.S. Senate passed in December 2005 is 796 pages long. As just one example, the Senate
bill would not grant blanket ‘amnesty’ for undocumented workers. Instead, the bill
divides the undocumented into three groups, depending on how long they have been in
the United States. Each group has its own eligibility requirements and restrictions.
Id.
216. See Kennedy, supra note 83 (“Extending 245(i) does not provide any loopholes for
potential terrorists. Instead, it will improve the monitoring of immigrants already residing in this
country. Individuals who qualify for permanent residency and process their applications in the U.S.
are subject to rigorous background checks and interviews. This process provides the government a
good opportunity to investigate individuals who are in this country and determine whether they
should be allowed to remain here.”); but see Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995,
Proceedings and Debates of the 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1996), 142 CONG. REC. H2,589-01,
H2,603 [hereinafter Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995] (statement by Rep. Dana
Rohrabacher, California) (“This loophole also has serious repercussions for the security of our
Nation. Under the Kennedy loophole, certain people who sneak across our border or illegally
overstay their visas can apply for permanent resident status at the local INS office.”).
217. See Barbara Jordan Immigration Reform and Accountability Act of 2002: Proceedings
and Debates of the 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002), 148 Cong. Rec. H1,632-03, H1,643 (statement
by Rep. Udall, Colorado) (offering support for reenacting Section 245(i): “this provision does not
grant an amnesty, give immigrants the right to work, or protect them from deportation if they are
living in the U.S. illegally. What it does do is keep families together and encourage those who
qualify for permanent residency to continue filling an economic need and to become part of a
regulated system.”).
218. Section 245(i) effectively incorporated many undocumented immigrants into the legal
process by promising not to arrest immigrants who filed applications. GREEN, supra note 58, at 64
(“The government promised it would not arrest illegal immigrants for deportation on the basis of
their 245(i) applications.”).
219. See Juffras, supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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proved capable of meeting this challenge. 220 Hundreds of thousands of
undocumented immigrants flocked to immigration attorneys during the
brief period when Section 245(i) was in effect. 221 When the Act expired
there were still many more immigrants who would have qualified for
Immigration
adjustment, but failed to meet the deadline. 222
practitioners’ familiarity with the law, and settled case law that provides
guidance on how the section works within the entire body of
immigration laws, indicate that Section 245(i) has established credible
reliance interests which will carry forward to a new reenactment. 223
Second, Section 245(i) effectively punished immigrants who had
skirted the law initially, and hence was not a “free pass” or an incentive
to break the law. 224 Immigrants, who relied on this alternative to
consular processing, paid a premium fee for the privilege, which was
five times in excess of the standard fee. In addition, the law did not
benefit all undocumented immigrants. 225 Rather, it selectively served
only the most deserving members of our society, those whose claim to
legal status was already supported by another existing code section. 226

220. Carlos Alcala, Many Try to Beat Residency Deadline: Extension is Likely but Lines Long
at INS, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 1, 1997, at B3 (chronicling the masses of immigrants who were
eager to take advantage of Section 245(i) before it expired: “Would-be immigrants lined up by the
hundreds at Sacramento immigration offices Tuesday - and the same scene played out around the
country.”).
221. See GREEN, supra note 58, at 64 (“The INS estimated that about 540,000 immigrants
would be eligible under the act.”).
222. See President Bush’s Letter to Congress, supra note 72.
223. See, e.g., Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Legal Immigration Family Equity Act (LIFE Act), and Regulations Promulgated Thereunder, 10
A.L.R. FED. 2D 435 (2006) (providing explanatory information on the application of Section 245(i)
and citing relevant case law to guide practitioners).
224. Legal Immigration Family Equity Act, § 1(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255 (West 2006) ; see
Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237, 1240 (2005) (“The Legal Immigration Family Equity
(LIFE) Act allows certain persons who entered without inspection or otherwise violated their status,
and thus are ineligible to apply for adjustment of status in the United States, to seek adjustment
nonetheless if they pay a $1,000 penalty.”); see also JAMES G. GIMPEL AND JAMES R. EDWARDS,
JR., THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 313 (1999) (referencing the penalty,
which at the time was $1,000 and stating that “245(i) had raised millions of dollars for the INS”).
225. Flores v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 2003) (establishing that adjustment of
status under Section 245(i) does not apply to an immigrant who has prior orders of removal); INS
on Amendment and Extension of Section 245(i), INS Memoranda , 2 BENDER’S IMMIGRATION
BULLETIN 1067 (1997) (“Under the amended section 245(i), aliens who do not meet the adjustment
requirements of section 245(a) are eligible to apply for adjustment of status only if they are
beneficiaries of a visa petition filed with the Attorney General under section 204 or a labor
certification which was filed pursuant to Department of Labor regulations.”).
226. Id; see also Kennedy, supra note 83 (providing the following statistic in support of
reenacting comprehensive immigration reform: “[s]eventy-five percent of the people who have used
245(i) are the spouses and children of U.S. citizens and permanent residents.”); Immigration in the
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Section 245(i) meets the demands of skeptics who argue that “amnesties
should be employed sparingly and carefully.” 227 As compared to IRCA,
which legalized approximately three million undocumented immigrants
in six years, 228 Section 245(i) had a much more modest impact. 229
Third, Section 245(i) does not send a message to foreigners that
undocumented immigration is an effective alternative to applying for
entry. 230 A principal criticism of legalization is that it will inspire new
immigrants to enter illegally. 231 In the final reenactment of Section
245(i) Congress specifically addressed this concern by adding a physical
presence requirement. 232 Following this additional requirement, any
immigrant who entered after the law went into effect could not access
the benefit. 233
National Interest Act of 1995, supra note 201, at H2,604 (statement by Rep. Xavier Becerra,
California) (lending his support for the provision: “Section 245(i) . . . does not permit anyone to
gain lawful permanent residence who would otherwise be disqualified.”).
227. Border Security and Immigration Issues Hearing, supra note 43 and accompanying text.
228. MEI LING REIN, IMMIGRATION AND ILLEGAL ALIENS: BURDEN OR BLESSING? 16 (The
Gale Group eds., Thompson Learning 2002).
229. See GREEN, supra note 58 and accompanying text (citing the number of immigrants which
the INS anticipated would be affected by the provision); see also Yearbook of Immigration
Statistics, Department of Homeland Security, Legal Permanent Residents, Data Tables,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/table01.xls; Legal Permanent Resident
Flow:
Fiscal
Years
1820
to
2005,
Table
1,
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/LPR05.shtm (showing a significant increase in
the number of adjustments between 1989-1991 when the bulk of IRCA applications were processed,
but no comparable increase after 1994 when Section 245(i) first passed). The report does show that
numbers rose to the IRCA levels following the cut-off date of Section 245(i) in 2001. Id. This
lends support to the argument that Section 245(i) should be reenacted permanently in order to avoid
this unmanageable swell in applicants. See also Nelly Jefferys & Nancy Rytina, supra note 4
(providing data on the total number of immigrants who have adjusted status). Unfortunately, the
report does not identify how many immigrants adjusted status using Section 245(i). Id. The report
does state: “In 2005, a total of 1,122,373 persons became LPRs [lawful permanent residents] of the
United States . . . . The majority (66 percent) lived in the United States when they became LPRs.”
Id. at 1.
230. See Alcala, supra note 220 and accompanying text (because Section 245(i) does not apply
to immigrants with prior orders of removal, it will not incite a wave of new undocumented
immigrants).
231. Don Feder, Illegal Immigrants Should Not Be Given Amnesty, in ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION;
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (Wiliam Dudley ed., 2002), at 125 (“Extending blanket amnesty tells
inhabitants of the impoverished Third World that if they can sneak past the Border Patrol, Uncle
Softie will eventually welcome them with open arms.”).
232. 146 CONG. REC. S11,850-02, S11,851 (2000) (explaining the nature and purpose of
Congress’ revisions to Section 245(i): “They also add a new requirement that for all beneficiaries
whose application was filed after January 14, 1998, the principal beneficiary must have been
physically present in the U.S. on the date of enactment of the LIFE Act Amendments of 2000. The
function of this last requirement is to make sure that the renewed availability of section 245(i) does
not operate to encourage anyone to violate our immigration laws.”).
233. Id.
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In addition to reenacting Section 245(i), Congress should also
consider removing the three and ten-year bars. 234 After careful
consideration of whether the bars serve their intended purpose, and
whether reenacting Section 245(i) would alone be an adequate safeguard
to prevent the deterrence to exit, a decision to remove the bars could
reduce the number of undocumented immigrants currently in the United
States. 235 Now that exceptional amounts of resources have been
dedicated to improving border security, it makes sense to remove the
disincentive for undocumented immigrants to cross back into their home
countries.
The arguments in support of legalization either deny that the
definition of amnesty should apply, or reject the notion that amnesty is
undesirable. 236 The two lines of argument are merely a difference in
semantics, but they illustrate the strong political clout the word
evokes. 237 Those who support amnesty and those who refute the idea
that a legalization process constitutes amnesty both agree that a welldrafted legalization statute can effectively address the undocumented
immigration population, and serve the objectives of comprehensive
immigration reform. 238
VIII. CONCLUSION
Amnesty proponents readily concede that undocumented
immigration is not a problem to be solved. 239 So long as there is no

234. See Foster, supra note 76 and accompanying text.
235. Id.
236. American Friends Service Committee, 'Legalization' or 'Amnesty'? Understanding the
Debate, http://www.afsc.org/immigrants-rights/policy/legalization-amnesty.htm (last visited Feb.
17, 2007) (explaining how the term amnesty is used among legalization advocates: “Within the
immigrants’ rights community, others argue that, although they also support granting LPR [lawful
permanent resident] status to undocumented immigrants, legislators in Congress are unwilling to
even begin a conversation if the term ‘amnesty’ is used. Therefore, they prefer the term
‘legalization.’”).
237. See Hearing on How Illegal Immigration Impacts Constituencies, Part II, supra note 147,
at 24 (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman, California) (identifying the linguistic distortion of the
term: “You can call anything an amnesty and defeat everything by doing it.”).
238. Id. at 5. Representative Jackson Lee explained that S. 2611 is not amnesty because it does
not “forget or overlook immigration law violations.” Id. at 4. She detailed how the Senate bill is
not an escape of responsibility: “[t]he Senate bill clearly asks those to get in line, to be able to be
documented, whether or not they can meet the standards of status or citizenship, keep their records
clean, employed for six years, to establish eligibility for permanent resident status and pay a
substantial fine.” Id. at 5.
239. MILTON D. MORRIS & ALBERT MAYIO, CURBING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 36 (The
Brookings Institution 1982) (“In view of the long history and powerful forces behind illegal
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realistic opportunity to enter legally at the onset, nor regularize once
here illegally, undocumented immigrants will continue to risk
deportation by averting the law. 240 Congress should nonetheless feel a
pressing duty to address the issue by crafting a functional immigration
code. 241 Immigration practitioners and the undocumented population
that seek their assistance need an outlet to engage the legal process. 242
In order to prove successful, immigration reform should focus on those
needs, rather than on constituents who have politicized the amnesty
debate. 243
In the current era of immigration policy, legalization efforts are
justifiably plagued by the legacy of IRCA. 244 Amnesty, as it is
understood in the immigration context, suffers from this unavoidable
correlation with a failed attempt to fix a vastly complex social dilemma
in one broad stroke. 245
The negative connotation which the term amnesty carries reflects
both myth and reality. 246 The reality is that full-scale amnesty, as
implemented in 1986, failed to rectify a broken immigration system. 247
The myth is that because of this failure all legalization attempts should
be subjected to heightened scrutiny and skepticism. 248
Rather,
predicting the success or failure of immigration reform measures
demands a tempered analysis. 249 Whether the concept is referred to as

immigration, no single act or set of actions by the United States will eliminate it. Illegal
immigration will always be part of American life.”).
240. Id.
241. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing lawmakers’ duty to address the
undocumented immigrant population).
242. It is Time to Reform Our Immigration Laws, Posted on AILA InfoNet at Doc. No.
02101071
(Oct.
10, 2002),
Inman
and
Associates, http://www.igvlaw.com/systmpl/newimmigrationlaw/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2007) (demonstrating immigration lawyers’ support
for legalization in general, and specifically for an extension of 245(i)).
243. Cf. Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of
Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1207 (describing
how immigration services focus on enforcement in order to appease constituents).
244. See notes 42-46 and accompanying text (connecting IRCA with the current amnesty
debate). See also Pia M. Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, Working Paper, Do Amnesty Programs
Encourage Illegal Immigration? Evidence from the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA),
12
Fed.
Res.
Bank
of
Atlanta
(2001),
available
at
http://www.frbatlanta.org/frbatlanta/filelegacydocs/wp0119.pdf (using the effects of IRCA as data
to conclude that amnesty programs do not incite additional waves of immigration).
245. Id.
246. See generally supra notes 159-179 and accompanying text.
247. See note 42 and accompanying text.
248. See note 173 and accompanying text.
249. See Lofgren, supra note 49, at 378-79 (concluding that radical changes to immigration
law will not produce the desired results of immigration reform).
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amnesty or legalization should be of no consequence to the utility of its
design. 250 Incorporating a provision in the INA that would enable
immigrants already within the United States to adjust their legal status
must be approached with reasoned analysis instead of fear or disdain. 251
The political dogma that drives criticism of amnesty must give way
to even-handed reform initiatives before Section 245(i) will have an
opportunity to resurface. 252 Despite proven success in attaining
immigration goals, 253 Section 245(i) is at the mercy of public opinion. 254
Once immigration policy debates shift from polarized factions to a
solution-oriented approach, Section 245(i) may eventually escape the
amnesty misnomer that currently prevents reenactment. 255
Without Section 245(i) in place to soften the effect of the bars, the
three and ten-year sanctions to reentry are simply too harsh to serve their
intended purpose. 256 So long as the bars act to trap undocumented
immigrants in the country, rather than deter illegal entry in the first
place, they are counter effective and therefore should be repealed. 257
Bryn Siegel

250. See notes 236-238 and accompanying text.
251. Enhanced Border Security Act, supra note 169 (statement by Sen. Tom Daschle, South
Carolina) (addressing criticism while urging Congress to extend Section 245(i): “Within hours after
the twin towers collapsed, we heard some people say that America should close its doors to
immigrants. Some people even said we should force out immigrants who are already here, working
and contributing to our society. People who say such things need to understand that our enemy is
not immigrants, it is intolerance and hatred.”).
252. Reid-Kennedy Hearing, supra note 11, at 24 (prepared statement of Alan K. Simpson,
Former U.S. Sen., Wyoming) (“IRCA’s lesson on guestworkers . . . is to make certain that the terms
of the program are dictated by sound practical policy, and not by coalition politics.”).
253. See Lofgren, supra note 49, at 363.
254. See note 162 and accompanying text.
255. See HING, supra note 101, at 43 (drawing the distinction between objective and subjective
rationales: “Any policy related to ‘solving’ the undocumented migration issue will be debated with
value-laden rhetoric and overtones of what is the morally right thing to do. Policymakers may act
on personal impulse and intuition or may look for objective guidance to help make a decision.”).
256. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
257. Id.
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